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Abstract
Public safety is negatively affected when arrest warrant information is not available to
law enforcement officers, judges, prosecutors, and other criminal justice practitioners.
The U.S. Government and the criminal justice community have advocated for electronic
warrant systems (e-warrants). Peace officers know that when e-warrant systems deliver
warrant information to them immediately from multiple jurisdictions, their safety is
increased. However, the factors that cause these e-warrants systems to improve safety are
not known. The purpose of this historical data analysis study was to determine if the use
of e-warrant systems resulted in shorter clearance times than the use of legacy paperbased systems. Stakeholder theory, open systems theory, and service-oriented
architecture theory were used to guide the quantitative research design. This study
compared 2 years of historical arrest warrants from 6 sheriffs’ departments organized into
population matched sets. Two-way ANOVA tests and nonparametric tests were
conducted to analyze the impact of the independent variables warrant system type and
case type on the dependent variables mean service days and percent warrants served. The
study showed that operating e-warrant systems in similar size sample agencies did not
ensure shorter mean service days and higher percent warrants served over legacy
systems, and it confirmed that more research is needed to determine other factors that
will lead to an improvement in these variables. The findings of this study may assist
agency executives and justice practitioners to identify other variables that may increase
effectiveness of e-warrant systems, thereby improving public and officer safety, both
important social benefits.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Information on active (servable) arrest warrants is often out of the immediate
reach of the peace officer on the street, despite widespread use of sophisticated electronic
information systems designed to make the officer’s job easier and to improve public
safety. The purpose of this study was to examine electronic arrest warrants (e-warrants)
used by law enforcement agencies and to better understand how they affect service times
and percent warrants served. Open systems theory, stakeholder theory, and IT serviceoriented architecture (SOA) provided a theoretical basis for this research. Investment in
warrant data sharing technology between courts, law enforcement agencies, and other
government entities is grounded in these theories, and it is supported by the U.S.
Department of Justice through grants, information, and technical support (Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2011b, p. 3). This study was an investigation of the actual effect of
advanced electronic warrant systems on agency effectiveness in clearing warrants.
This chapter contains a historical background explicating the social need for
improvements, a problem statement, research questions and hypotheses, a descriptive
nature of the study, operational definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations,
limitations, and a concise section outlining the significance of the study.
Background of the Study
Little research is available on the topic of electronic warrants, and most extant
literature is connected to the U.S. federal government directly or indirectly through
funding of industry and academic programs. Researchers aggregate warrants with other
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criminal justice documents, such as arrest records and jail booking records, when
researching information exchanges (Geerkin, 2008). I found no evidence of agency
warrant service improvements in the literature. The remainder of this section contains a
sampling of compelling past criminal cases and other information which established the
need for improvements in how arrest warrants are recorded, tracked, shared, and cleared.
Two months before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United
States, attack mastermind Mohammed Atta was pulled over in Delray Beach, Florida for
speeding. The officer was unaware that Atta had an arrest warrant for failure to appear for
driving without a license in adjacent Broward County, and no arrest was made (Reynolds,
Griset, & Scott, 2006). On September 11, 2001 Atta took control of American Airlines
Flight 11 and crashed the Boeing 767 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center,
killing all on board and an unknown number of people in the tower (National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Had the officer been
informed of Atta’s active warrant, he would likely have detained or arrested Atta, and the
authorities might have been tipped off to the larger terrorist plot by something in his
possession or by his behavior. It is plausible that the 9/11 terrorist attack might have been
thwarted if Atta’s active warrant information had been shared across a single county line.
There are many less reported examples like Atta’s. A woman was fatally shot by
her ex-husband in Minneapolis in 1997 while he was out on bond awaiting conviction for
killing his ex-wife’s new boyfriend (Harrison, 2002). The killer had previously been
arrested in a neighboring county for threatening to kill his ex-wife with a gun, and the
judge did not know of the previous arrest when he ordered the release (Harrison, 2002).
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In 2008, Judge Michael Marcus, in testimony before the Oregon Ways and Means
Committee, explained how he had released an arrestee who, within 48 hours of his
release, brutalized a family. Judge Marcus read about the crime that he had enabled in a
newspaper the next day, and later he cited the lack of reliable information about
individuals, including warrants, as a primary cause of this tragedy and stated that system
improvements were needed to prevent future similar incidents (Marcus, 2008).
These examples are not isolated incidents. Geerkin (2002) identified improper
release or failure to hold as a common problem type in a taxonomy of integration-related
criminal justice system problems, citing unknown warrant or detainer as a key subtype.
The same report contains accounts from 21 incidents, many resulting in loss of life, that
could have been prevented with better information sharing between systems (Geerkin,
2002, pp. 9, 18-33). Historical accounts such as these support the assertion that improved
information sharing improves public safety.
Many states operate an electronic warrant repository and share information with
the FBI. According to a 2011 survey of states, 67% of states with a warrant repository
send felony warrants to the FBI National Crime Information Center (NCIC); however,
the completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of warrant information vary (National Center
for State Courts & SEARCH, 2011, p. 18). Thirty one of the 45 respondents that have
state warrant repositories agree or strongly agree that they are able to “share information
as necessary to ensure records are updated” (National Center for State Courts &
SEARCH, 2011, p. 16). The completeness and quality of shared warrant information
needs improvement to increase reliability and user confidence.
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Lawmakers and criminal justice associations have funded justice information
sharing projects through federal programs. The Crime and Identification Technology Act
(CITA) became federal law in 1999 and authorized $250 million per year for 5 years in
state grants to “promote the integration of justice systems information and identification
technology” (D. J. Roberts, 2004, p. 1). Government and industry organizations,
including the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics; the Federal Bureau
of Investigation; the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative Advisory Committee
(known as GLOBAL); the IJIS Institute; the National Center for State Courts; and
SEARCH, the National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics, advocate the
use of e-warrant systems (Melnick et al., 2005; D. J. Roberts, 2004; Walbolt Wagner,
2006; Wormeli, 2009). Taxpayer-funded federal grants are available to agencies for
implementing new systems (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011b); yet, the outcome of
these systems has not been adequately scientifically measured after implementation.
Judges, attorneys, law enforcement officers, and other government officials across
the United States make life changing decisions every day that directly impact the safety,
freedom, and well-being of the public. Principle decision makers in the U.S. criminal
justice system frequently must make decisions (e.g., setting bonds, sentencing, parole,
release, licensing) with incomplete or inaccurate information (Geerkin, 2002; Marcus,
2008). If a judge sets a low bail for a defendant and the defendant has a violent criminal
history in the same or another jurisdiction, the result could be more crimes committed as
in the Minnesota and Oregon cases mentioned previously.
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Problem Statement
The general problem that is the focus of this study is that public safety is
negatively affected when arrest warrant information is not available to law enforcement
officers, judges, prosecutors, and other criminal justice practitioners. Law enforcement
officers know that they are safer when e-warrant systems deliver warrant information to
them immediately from multiple jurisdictions. Federal government officials and industry
group leaders promote standards and best practices for electronic warrant systems
(Bettelli, 2005; Marz & Scott III, 2010; Melnick et al., 2005; D. J. Roberts, 2004;
Walbolt Wagner, 2006). The specific problem is that the e-warrant factors that enhance
safety are not known (Ward, 2010). A lack of empirical studies exists in the literature to
support that agencies using electronic warrant systems are more effective for bringing
wanted persons to justice than agencies using predominantly paper-based warrant
systems (Zaworski, 2004). When measured in aggregate for an agency, effectiveness is
measured by the average time required to serve a warrant and by the percent of all
warrants that have been served. Greater efficiency is indicated by shorter warrant service
times and higher percentages served.
The background section contains the practical social problem of imperfect warrant
information as well as anecdotal evidence of justice information system failures (Geerkin,
2002). The potential societal impacts of more advanced methods of creating, distributing,
and managing arrest warrants include improved public safety, timely justice, and
government efficacy and efficiency. Systems improvements are needed, but little
scientific research is available to support the idea that advanced information systems lead
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to improved law enforcement performance (Zaworski, 2004, pp. 1-2). Without sufficient
and compelling evidence in the literature and from practice, the impact of these programs
may not be known.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative study was to validate or refute assertions of
government and industry associations that more advanced e-warrant systems produce
improved arrest results as measured by the dependent variables mean service days and
percent warrants served. Independent variables were warrant system type and case type.
If officer safety can be improved, fugitives can be apprehended, false arrests and
other errors can be reduced, operational efficiencies can be gained, and criminal and
terrorist acts can be prevented by deploying higher maturity level warrant systems, then
state and local agency executives and managers need to review the evidence to better
inform their resource and budget decisions. This study was designed to obtain and reveal
this evidence.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research Questions
An important measure of law enforcement performance is how quickly warrants
are served after being ordered by the court. This leads to the four research questions of
this study:
1A.

To what extent does the use of electronic warrant systems result in shorter
mean service days than the use of legacy paper-based warrant systems?
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1B.

To what extent does the use of electronic warrant systems result in greater
percent warrants served than the use of legacy paper-based warrant
systems?

2A.

How does the mean service days compare between the two systems for
each case type?

2B.

How does the percent warrants served compare between the two systems
for each case type?

I designed the first pair of questions (1A and 1B) to determine if electronic
warrant systems change the mean service days or percent warrants served for all
warrants. The second pair of questions was designed to compare mean service days and
percent warrants served in the two systems by case type. Courts issue warrants for a
variety of different causes (case types) such as felony charges, misdemeanor charges,
bench warrants, traffic violations, and so on.
Hypotheses
If electronic warrant systems produce faster arrest times, then historical data
should support this assertion. I compared historical warrant data over a 2-year period
from six different county sheriff’s departments in pairs. Each county pair included a
county that used a traditional predominantly paper-based warrant system and one that
used an electronic warrant system. I evaluated the dependent variables mean service days
and percent warrants served over the study period for each agency. The independent
variable warrant system type indicated which agency’s system warrant data was being

8
analyzed. The other independent variable case type was examined as a possible influence
on service times. I posited the following null hypotheses, one for each research question:
H01A: Mean service days will be equal for both values of warrant system type.
Restated, the mean service days for warrants during the multiyear period will be equal in
the two sheriff’s agencies.
Ha1A: Mean service days will not be equal for both values of warrant system type.
H01B: Percent warrants served will be equal for both values of warrant system
type. Restated, the percent warrants served for warrants during the multiyear period will
be equal in the two sheriff’s agencies.
Ha1B: Percent warrants served will not be equal for both values of warrant system
type.
H02A: Mean service days will be equal in both systems for all values of case type.
Mean service days for similar case types (felony, misdemeanor, traffic, etc.) will be equal
between the two compared systems.
Ha2A: Mean service days will not be equal for both systems for all values of case
type.
H02B: Percent warrants served will be equal in both systems for all values of case
type. In other words, percent warrants served for similar case types (felony,
misdemeanor, traffic, etc.) will be equal between the two compared systems.
Ha2B: Percent warrants served will not be equal in both systems for all values of
case type.
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I used, as the primary method of analysis, a two-factor analysis of variance
(ANOVA) statistical test with mean service days as the dependent variable and warrant
system type and case type as the independent variables. A second set of ANOVA
statistical tests were run with percent warrants served as the dependent variable and the
other variables remaining the same.
Theoretical Framework for this Study
The notion that an arrest warrant is likely to be served more quickly when it is
electronically distributed within an agency and across multiple agencies is part of a
national trend towards integrated justice information systems (IJIS). The idea that sharing
information among stakeholders in external organizations benefits the information owner
(law enforcement agency) and the task environment (criminal justice system) is not a new
concept. This study was inspired by, and its research design was based upon, three
theoretical foundations: stakeholder theory, open systems theory, and service-oriented
architecture (SOA) theory. An in-depth examination of these theories, as they apply to
this study, is presented in Chapter 2.
Nature of the Study
This section contains the general research approach and rationale for a
quantitative study on the efficacy of electronic warrant information systems. This study
was conducted using a quantitative research design with an historical analysis approach,
as defined by Singleton and Straits (2010, p. 393), using available electronic warrant data
collected from different types of warrant systems in different counties. This was a quasiexperimental quantitative design because samples were not randomly assigned to study
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groups (Trochim, 2001, p. 294). Specifically, this design was a posttest-only contrasted
groups design as described by Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1996, p. 132). I used
the data files of extracted warrant records from sheriffs’ office computer information
system databases as the unit of data analysis. I conducted ANOVA and non-parametric
statistical analysis using SPSS software. I selected a quantitative historical analysis
design for this investigation because complete sets of detailed warrant records were
available for long periods of time in both relatively simple systems and more advanced
systems.
I analyzed and compared warrant file extracts from six different sheriffs’ offices
grouped in pairs for the same 2-year period. I selected counties for their warrant systems
in use based on the electronic warrant maturity model (EWM2) presented in Chapter 3.
The proposal for this study called for comparing a single pair of counties’ warrant
records. This was expanded to three county pairs after an examination of available
historical data. One system in each pair was a relatively immature paper-based process
using a simple electronic file warrant tracking system, and the other was a more advanced
e-warrant database system. I collected data by obtaining written permission from the
governing agency to conduct a study using their data. I first analyzed the nature of the
available data, including table structures, data definitions, data values, and metadata and
then requested a specific query to extract a final data set. To maintain the integrity of the
study, and to avoid any perception of researcher misuse of data, I excluded from the
database extracts all personal identifiers for human warrant subjects (e.g., name, social
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security number, address, date of birth, contact information, etc.). County and state names
also remained confidential to avoid other possible concerns of the subject agencies.
Operational Definitions
Variables
Bond amount: Is a dollar amount for bail, and it is commonly assigned by a judge
when a warrant is issued. Generally speaking, high bond amounts are set for more serious
crimes. Some warrants for serious crimes or for high flight risk individuals may be set to
no bond, meaning that the accused cannot post bond to get out of jail until his or her court
appearance. A bail bond is a financial guarantee that the defendant will appear in court at
a designated date and time or forfeit the bond amount. Bond amount is defined for
understanding; however, it was removed as a research variable at data collection time as
explained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
Mean service days: A calculated arithmetic mean of time measured in days from
warrant issue date to the date a warrant is served as measured in days. Mean service days
did not include active (open) warrants or warrants that were administratively recalled or
vacated. Mean service days was a measure of warrant service effectiveness and was a
dependent variable in this study.
Percent warrants served: The percentage of all warrants over a selected period
that have been served by arrest (#warrants served divided by #total active and served
warrants). This statistic did not count warrants that were administratively recalled or
vacated. Like mean service days, percent warrants served was a measure of warrant
service effectiveness and was a dependent variable in this study. Note: This term is
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generally synonymous with the industry term clearance rate; however, because clearance
rate is most often used to describe the status of criminal cases, not just warrants, I have
chosen to use the precise mathematical term in this research.
Warrant system type: A Boolean variable used to indicate the warrant system
source of data. I used this independent variable to distinguish the more advanced
electronic warrant system from the less mature system in each county pair.
Case type: A designation of the type of offense charged to a defendant such as
felony, misdemeanor, traffic, and so on. Case type was an independent variable in this
study. Warrant systems typically store this as an attribute of a warrant.
Other Terms Used in This Study
Clearance time: Time period from warrant issue date to the date a warrant is
served or vacated; synonymous with service time.
E-government: “E-government provides governmental services electronically,
usually over the Web, to reduce the physical character of customer transactions by
recreating them virtually” (Calista & Melitski, 2007, p. 101).
E-governance: “Employing the Web and Internet to overhaul how the state
conducts its democratic dealings by using networked interactions with citizens to foster
transparency and participation” (Calista & Melitski, 2007, p. 102).
E-warrant: An arrest warrant is a court order to law enforcement officers to arrest
the named individual and bring him or her to appear before the court to face criminal
charges. The term e-warrant is becoming more widely used in government documents
and literature with a range of different meanings. As a practical matter for information
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technology (IT) professionals and scholars, a rigorous definition of e-warrant is required.
Due to the lack of a standard formal definition for e-warrant and e-warrant system, I
offered the following definitions: (a) an e-warrant is an authoritative legal electronic
record of an arrest warrant and (b) an e-warrant system is a computer information system
that supports requesting, filing, dissemination, service, and vacating of arrest warrant
records. A rigorous electronic warrant maturity model for e-warrant systems is described
in Chapter 3.
Extensible markup language (XML): “A text-based scripting language used to
describe data structures hierarchically, using HTML-like tags” (Hoffer, Ramesh, & Topi,
2013, p. 360).
Global reference architecture (GRA): Formerly Justice Reference Architecture,
an information sharing reference architecture for identifying, defining, implementing, and
governing services developed by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs (Department of Justice, n.d.).
Integrated Justice: A method of electronic criminal justice information sharing
that benefits participating agencies and enables better informed decision making
(Hargreaves, 1998). Integrated justice information systems (IJIS) are based on technical
standards and common business definitions (Hargreaves, 1998, p. 288).
National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP): A program of the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice to
provide “direct awards and technical assistance to states to improve the quality,
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timeliness, and immediate accessibility of criminal history records and related
information” (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2012, para. 1).
National Crime Information Center (NCIC): “An automated database of criminal
justice and justice-related records maintained by the FBI. The database includes the ‘hot
files’ of wanted and missing persons, stolen vehicles and identifiable stolen property,
including firearms” (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011a, p. 1).
National Information Exchange Model (NIEM): “A community-driven,
government-wide, standards-based approach to exchanging information” (National
Information Exchange Model, 2011, para. 1).
Service-oriented architecture (SOA): “A collection of services that communicate
with each other in some manner, usually by passing data or coordinating a business
activity. While these services do not have to be Web services, Web services are the
predominant mechanism used” (Hoffer et al., 2013, p. 368).
Service time: The duration from the time an arrest warrant is issued to the time the
warrant is served; synonymous with clearance time.
Assumptions, Scope, Delimitations, and Limitations
Assumptions
The research design was based upon assumptions about the nature of people,
organizations, and society. The primary assumptions of this study were
1.

Arrest warrants issued by courts and served by law enforcement are an
essential element in the U.S. criminal justice system and benefit public
safety with their proper application. This assumption was essential to this
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study because without it, any demonstrated value of e-warrant systems
would be of no value to society.
2.

Courts, law enforcement, and other government agencies seek efficient
and effective warrant processes. As with assumption #1, this assumption
espouses the moral duty of public servants. Without this, this study would
have no practical value to government and society because government
actors would not value more efficient systems, and likely would not invest
limited resources to implement them.

3.

The more effort required of an officer to check a subject for warrants, the
more likely it will not be done (i.e., passive warrant check systems are
better than action-required systems). This assumption was important
because I attempted to show that making warrant information accessible to
officers in the field may be a factor in improving arrest rates.

Statistical Assumptions
Rutherford (2012) instructed that four assumptions are necessary for a statistically
strong ANOVA test:
1.

Each condition contains a random sample of the population of such scores

2.

The scores in each condition are distributed normally

3.

The scores in each condition are independent of each other

4.

The variances of the scores in each experimental condition are
homogeneous (Rutherford, 2012, pp. 236-237).
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I examined each assumption for validity in the test results and reported any
failures or partial failures and the potential impact on internal validity in Chapter 4.
Scope and Delimitations
The scope of this study was delimited to warrant history records collected from
four pairs of similar-size county sheriff’s departments in the United States. Each pair had
one county with a relatively less sophisticated warrant tracking system and another that
employed an advanced more interoperable and accessible e-warrant system. A system for
rating the relative degree of sophistication in warrant systems and what constitutes an
e-warrant system is proposed in Chapter 2. Search warrants were not the object of study.
Search warrants serve a different purpose in law enforcement. I received a data extract
for the same 2-year period from January,1 2012 to December 31, 2013. I selected this
date range to obtain a large amount of recent data covering a sufficiently long period
based on availability. This study is similar to a multicase qualitative study, but the data
were predominantly quantitative, and I used hypothesis testing to investigate the research
questions.
Internal validity is defined as establishing the cause-and-effect relationship in the
traditional sense because the treatment is not an action of an experiment; rather, it is the
selection of different systems and data to study. The treatment is implicit in the type of
warrant systems selected and the quality of the data. The less sophisticated system could
be considered the untreated sample or control and the more advanced system the treated
system.
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Generalizability to other jurisdictions (external validity) is limited; however, this
research is a first-of-its-kind study, and it is a basis for future studies using data from
more agencies, different maturity level systems, and diverse geographic areas. Chapter 3
contains a proposed e-warrant system maturity model with defined levels of
sophistication and interoperability. I applied this framework to the subject county warrant
systems to define their scalar position and relative range to each other.
Limitations
The limitations to this study centered on the data sets used and their system
contexts. I analyzed the historical arrest warrant data used in this study as-is without
questioning its accuracy or completeness. As with all computer systems and user-created
information, there were data quality questions. System users may be inconsistent entering
and updating warrant information. Policies and instructions governing how to use the
system can change over time, and periodic system improvements and personnel changes
may affect data quality and completeness. Information systems architecture can affect
data quality and completeness. Despite expected common data quality problems, the data
received from the state court administrator were used as-is, and no effort was made to
correct possible mistakes.
I informally interviewed the state court IT personnel to collect general
information about how the systems are used, what changes occurred over the 10-year
period, and any known problems with data quality, and this information is included in the
final report.
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As discussed in the previous section, external validity of this study is limited to
similar agencies and systems, but this study may enable future, more diverse studies.
Sampling (systemic) bias was not a factor because the data samples were complete
warrant records for the selected counties, and the counties were selected based on factors
not previously known. The two basis non-e-warrant counties chosen were the only two
counties in the study state that did not use an e-warrant system. Other common types of
bias such as interviewing bias, response bias, and survey bias were not factors because
the data did not originate from interviews or surveys.
Significance of the Study
This study was designed to measure any realized benefits of deploying electronic
warrants in law enforcement agencies. As such, the findings of this study may directly
inform leaders in the U.S. criminal justice system how to improve arrest results using
information technologies for an increased societal benefit.
The potential benefits to society fall into three general categories: (a) public
safety, (b) justice served, and (c) government effectiveness and efficiency. If e-warrants
are shown to improve arrest performance, the safety of the general public and peace
officers in the field may improve, crimes may be prevented, and communities may
benefit. When a fugitive is arrested and brought before the courts, the administration of
justice is facilitated; defendants may be punished, exonerated, or rehabilitated; and
victims may be paid restitution. The last category of potential benefits is improvement of
government-to-citizen (G2C) services by effective use of e-government technologies and
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e-governance policies as defined earlier. The potential e-warrant benefits in the G2C
category include:
1.

Leveraging technology investments for interoperability and improved
vertical and horizontal communications among criminal justice system
agencies. This concept is described in detail in Chapter 2 using a Justice
Information Systems Distribution Matrix (JISDM). Example benefits
include avoiding redundant data entry, automated person matching
algorithms, federated searches, etc.

2.

Replacing manual processes and legacy technologies (fax, phone, paper
documents, etc.) with automation for transmission, searching, alerting, and
so on, which provides faster and more accurate information when and
where it is most needed

3.
4.

Aggregation and deduplication of criminal records
Stewardship of taxpayer treasure, including prioritizing objectives for
federal grants to states for criminal justice information system (CJIS)
programs.
Summary

This chapter contained an introduction to e-warrant systems and their potential
social value, the need for research to validate the purported benefits of e-warrant systems,
a theoretical research paradigm, and a high-level design for a quantitative study. A
review of past criminal cases where more complete and accessible warrant information
could have resulted in the prevention of serious crimes and human suffering is a
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compelling case for social change. The suggested benefits of advanced e-warrant systems
are public safety benefits, timely justice benefits, and improved government processes.
Stakeholder theory; open systems theory, and service-oriented architecture provided the
theoretical lens for analysis and research design.
Chapter 2 contains a comprehensive literature review of e-warrants in the
integrated justice context which demonstrates a gap in the literature and a need for
research to validate the social benefits of e-warrants.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
A current review of related literature is required to (a) confirm the research
problem that how e-warrant systems improve safety is not known, (b) to confirm that
current research on e-warrants systems is insufficient, and (c) to identify any prior
scholarly research related to the purpose of this research. Hence, this is a literature review
of the extant research surrounding electronic warrant systems. During the quest for
relevant prior research on electronic warrants, I discovered two phenomena that had
significant effects on the finished product.
First, electronic warrants are one of many criminal justice information exchange
documents that are routinely considered with other criminal justice documents in research
projects and in actual information system programs; hence, little research exists on
electronic warrant systems alone. The extant research on e-warrants is summarized in this
chapter and consists primarily of case studies of crimes that might have been prevented
by the use of an e-warrants system. An accounting and characterization of references
reviewed in this literature review is contained in the section titled Analysis of Literature
Related to Key Concepts later in this chapter.
Second, the majority of research on the subject occurred in the few years
following 9-11, and it is connected to federal programs of the U.S. Department of Justice
either by direct government report or conference proceeding or by a federal grantsponsored university or industry association study. Because criminal justice is primarily
the domain of public sector governance, most of the research in the field is driven by
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government entities. The Bureau of Justice Assistance Center for Program Evaluation
encourages more research on justice information sharing outcomes, and they attribute
“newness of work in this area” to the lack of scholarly research (Reynolds et al., 2006, p.
4). This study was needed because of the scarcity of research on justice information
sharing, especially electronic warrant systems.
It is important to draw a contrast between this dissertation and the academic
research in criminology and sociology fields which seeks to explain the underlying
causes of criminal behaviors or to improve methods of punishment and criminal
rehabilitation. My research was aimed not at explaining criminal behaviors, but at
seeking to understand how technology can be used to protect the general public and
improve government efficiency at the local, state, tribal, and federal levels. As an IT
practitioner for over 30 years, a consultant in government justice information systems,
and a reserve peace officer, I am motivated to seek improvements in the ways
information can be used to fight crime and serve the cause of public safety.
This literature review is organized into six major sections: (a) Literature Search
Strategy, (b) Arrest Warrants: A Key Justice Information Exchange, (c) Theoretical
Framework for E-warrants and IJIS, (d) State of Integration of Justice Information
Systems in the U.S., (e) Findings/Recommendations, and (f) Summary and Conclusion.
Literature Search Strategy
The references found for this review came from a variety of sources including the
Walden University Library databases, Google Scholar, the Association for Computing
Machinery (ACM) Digital Library, printed books and reports, and U.S. Government and
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industry web sites. Search keywords used included ARJIS, CJIS, e-court, e-warrant,
e-government, electronic warrant, GJXDM, IJIS, information sharing, integrated justice,
JIEM, JNET, NCIC, NIEM, SOA, and XML. This literature review represents over 2 1/2
years of searching for relevant materials. Due to the limited quantity of available research
on electronic warrants, I supplemented the search with several personal and e-mail
contacts with academic, government, and industry association professionals, some of
whom authored literature cited in this review. In addition, I invited Dr. Robert Roper,
former chief information officer for Colorado courts, to participate as an external member
of my dissertation supervisory committee. Dr. Roper has first-hand experience
implementing electronic warrant systems. Because little research on electronic warrants
was found to exist, I conducted a general literature search on justice information
exchanges. I define arrest warrants in the context of justice information exchanges in the
next section.
I have supplemented this literature with my own past course work at Walden
University on the topic of IJIS and electronic warrants in the IJIS context. I have
developed two reference models to guide the analysis of the literature and compare and
contrast electronic warrant systems in the United States; thus, where appropriate, I have
cited my previous work in this chapter and the next.
Arrest Warrants: A Key Justice Information Exchange
In this chapter, I focused on one IJIS information exchange, the arrest warrant in
the geopolitical context of a county in a U.S. state, and the potential to improve public
safety and government effectiveness through better warrant systems. An arrest warrant is
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a court order to law enforcement officers to arrest an individual and bring him or her
before a court for adjudication on criminal charges. Police record management systems
(RMS) automate the core business of law enforcement agencies to include incident and
arrest reports, personnel records, criminal records, and crime analysis data, but many
RMS systems lack the connectivity with other local, state, and federal information
systems needed to search for active arrest warrants (Dunworth, 2005). Snavely, Taxman,
and Gordon (2005, p. 196) categorized criminal justice information systems as closed
systems, open systems, or consent-driven systems (p. 196). Closed systems do not
interoperate well with external systems (Snavely et al., 2005, p. 197).
When an officer makes a routine contact with a wanted person, such as during a
traffic stop, the officer can be exposed to personal danger, and the subject may not be
arrested because active warrant information is not known. The traffic offender may be
issued a citation, given a written or verbal warning, and then released (e.g., Mohamed
Atta). This scenario brings to the fore two procedural barriers to obtaining warrant
information.
First, most officers do not routinely request a warrant check on every traffic stop
because the check takes more time while stopped and exposed on the side of the road.
With a closed system RMS design, an automatic warrant check is not triggered. A
warrant check is routinely reserved for situations where the officer suspects that the
subject may be involved in other criminal activity. Without an automated instant lookup
capability found in some e-warrant systems, warrants are not routinely and automatically
checked when officers contact individuals. Hager (2005) stated, “Instant lookup at traffic
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stops and other encounters helps law enforcement determine the level of caution needed
to ensure the safety of officers and the public, and can ensure that all outstanding
warrants are served, especially from other jurisdictions” (p. vii). For the above stated
reasons, warrants are not always checked when police contact citizens.
The second barrier is that complete and accurate warrant information may not be
available to the dispatcher or the field officer (or other justice system worker). Criminals
do not respect jurisdictional boundaries, but many closed system law enforcement
systems do (Harrison, 2002, p. 1; Zaworski, 2004, p. 17). A felony warrant issued in a
neighboring county or state is not always available to the patrol officer, judge,
investigator, probation officer, or social worker due to the silo effect of independently
maintained and isolated information systems (MacLellan, 2004, p. 2). Both of the above
information barriers can be addressed with improved information system technology
(Stoltzfus, 2009, p. 89).
Active arrest warrants and criminal history records are vital to many decision
makers in the criminal justice system besides the patrol officer. Prosecutor charging
decisions often hinge on prior arrests and convictions. Judges determine an individual’s
eligibility for foster parenting, guardianships, and permanent home placements for some
of the United States’ most vulnerable citizens—deprived children. Judges need
information about individuals from all types of cases and information systems to inform
their decisions about releases, bond amounts, custody of minor children, sentences, and
many other matters. Sharing warrant information between the courts, prosecutors, and
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law enforcement in an accurate and timely manner is paramount in an effective and
efficient justice system.
Warrant Information Systems in the United States
FBI NCIC warrant system. The FBI’s NCIC system is used by local, state,
tribal, and federal agencies as a central repository for arrest warrants. The NCIC system
contained 1,937,308 active wanted person records (warrants) as of November 2011 (J.
Arnold personal communication, December 23, 2011). NCIC is the nation’s central
warrant repository, but it is incomplete, sometimes inaccurate, and not always available
to officers in a timely manner (National Center for State Courts & SEARCH, 2011, pp.
13-17).
The FBI’s NCIC warrant system is a hierarchical centralized distribution model
that depends on a chain of vertically integrated information flows from the local court or
agency to the state repository to the federal repository then back down to the local agency
that needs the information in real-time to protect officers and citizens. MacLellan (2004)
stated:
Twelve million index crimes (e.g., murder, rape, robbery, burglary, etc.) were
committed in 2001, and most of the information gathered in response to these
crimes was generated by local law enforcement, local courts, and local jails. To
enable federal, state, and local law enforcement to work effectively, this
information must be integrated upward into state and federal systems (p. 1).
An e-warrant system designed to serve state and local agencies would operate on
a network model where warrant information is distributed directly to local officers within
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the agency and to other nearby local agencies (horizontal integration) without requiring a
hierarchical upload/download process. In this manner, warrants on locally wanted
persons are distributed directly to the agencies most likely to encounter the warrant
subject. Central data collection is not a requisite for e-warrant systems. Warrant data can
reside where it is owned, but subscribed to by agencies most likely to need it. This more
tactical approach is aimed at maximum local utility; whereas, NCIC uses the central
repository approach, which is data collection focused with less emphasis on local
expediency (National Center for State Courts & SEARCH, 2011; Stoltzfus, 2009, p. 89).
The NCIC system operates by requiring state and local agencies to enter new
warrants and clear them when they are served— a burden to agencies facing resource and
budget pressures (National Center for State Courts & SEARCH, 2011, pp. 11-13).
Typically, the NCIC system is accessed by local agencies through a proprietary system
operated by a designated agency in each state. A lack of integration with local law
enforcement systems may be a factor contributing to low usage. The FBI imposes
training and operational requirements on NCIC data entry operators. Consequently, not
all serious criminal warrants are entered into NCIC. When local courts and agencies fail
to enter warrants into NCIC, the centralized warrant system model is compromised.
NCIC, like most federal systems, relies on a centralized collection and control
information model (Pardo, Gil-Garcia, & Burke, 2008, p. 2).This national warrant
repository model is functional, but limited in effectiveness at the state and local levels.
Geerkin (2008) referred to NCIC as a “bulletin board”-type system that has limited
usefulness because it requires manual effort to remember to check for warrants at crucial
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times such as when an inmate is about to be released. Perbix (2001) noted that substantial
delays between court actions to issue or recall a warrant creates an officer safety issue
(2001, p. 1).
A passive warrant system architecture would include an automatic check during
critical points in the criminal justice process, such as when an inmate is being released. If
the releasing agency does not check NCIC for new or old warrants before release, a
warrant can be missed and the subject can be released with an active arrest warrant.
Ironically, federal law enforcement agencies make far fewer fugitive contacts (warrant
arrest opportunities) than do municipal police, county sheriffs, and state law enforcement,
but the federal NCIC system has limited value to state and local authorities (Stoltzfus,
2009, p. 89).
Many local agencies do not consistently submit warrants to the federal system due
to manpower shortages and other local priorities. The National Center for State Courts
and SEARCH (2011) on state warrant systems found that in 45 responding states, the top
two warrant reporting challenges were staffing (87% respondents) and budget (80%
respondents), and technology constraints rated a distant third with 58% respondents
(2011, p. 21). This creates a situation where NCIC has incomplete warrant information,
thus decreasing its utility to local law enforcement. It is local police officers, deputy
sheriffs, and state troopers who have the most frequent citizen contact and, therefore,
stand to make the greatest positive impact to public safety.
State warrant repositories. Most states operate some form of a warrant
repository to support law enforcement agencies; however, integration with courts, local
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law enforcement, and NCIC varies; thus, the repositories have completeness, accuracy,
and timeliness anomalies that reduce their reliability (National Center for State Courts &
SEARCH, 2011, pp. 13-17). The term repository refers only to the distribution model and
not the level of integration with state and local agencies, although the U.S. Department of
Justice advocates for states to maintain a state central warrant records repository
(National Center for State Courts & SEARCH, 2011). The NCSC and SEARCH (2011)
revealed that of 45 state respondents, the following have automatic warrant transmission
capabilities:


27 (60%) law enforcement to the state’s central warrant repository



26 (58%) law enforcement directly to NCIC



18 (40%) courts to the state’s central warrant repository



12 (27%) courts to local law enforcement



9 (20%) courts directly to NCIC



21 (47%) state’s central warrant repository to NCIC



Only 3 states reported having all six forms of electronic warrant
transmission capability (National Center for State Courts & SEARCH,
2011, p. 17)

Cross-jurisdictional warrant system integration. The survey instrument used in
the NCSC report contained only yes or no questions about electronic transfers; thus, a yes
response indicates the existence of one or more such interfaces. Using the court-to-state
repository interface as an example, if one court (county) system in a state transmits to the
state repository, it would appear that all courts also report. Thus, the actual degree of
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warrant system interconnectedness varies from location to location within the state, and
the overall percentage of total warrants reported may be small.
To illustrate why cross-jurisdictional system integration is important, consider a
hypothetical example: an arrest warrant for John Doe is issued in a county court for a
felony crime. The new arrest warrant is entered into the district court system, and it may
or may not be electronically transmitted to a local law enforcement system or the state
warrant repository. If the same individual is stopped for a minor traffic violation in a
nearby county the next day, the contacting officer and the dispatcher may not see the
active felony warrant unless their municipal or county systems are integrated. Many law
enforcement agencies keep paper copies of warrants and re-enter the warrant information
into their local system after a paperwork delay. The typical outcome of this example
scenario is that the driver is issued a warning or citation for a traffic violation and
released, and justice is not served.
Information sharing standards. The federal government has been working with
state and local agencies and the private sector software and services industries to
establish a GRA of best practices and technical standards for information sharing
horizontally and vertically in the criminal justice space. The advent of XML technology
simplifies data and document sharing between disparate systems. A central clearinghouse
for electronic justice document formats based on the National Information Exchange
Model (NIEM) is now in operation and free to practitioners (Marz & Scott III, 2010).
NIEM is a federal government “partnership of the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
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services” (National Information Exchange Model, 2011, p. 1). NIEM operates a National
Information Sharing Standards Help Desk for government IT practitioners (National
Information Exchange Model, 2011). Agencies submit commonly used information
exchanges to the information exchange package documentation (IEPD) clearinghouse for
others to reuse. Currently there are more than 70 IEPDs in the IEPD Clearinghouse
(Department of Justice, 2011).
Federal funding for justice information sharing programs. The U.S.
Department of Justice has been offering financial grants to the states for many years to
advance information sharing and criminal history reporting. However, the National
Criminal History Improvement (NCHIP) program awards grants for the collection of
justice information at the federal level with less focus on horizontal sharing across the
justice levels where most information about people and crimes is collected and
consumed. NCHIP funding is limited and administered by elected officials and
bureaucrats. Agency executives are often faced with strategic questions whether to hire
new officers, build a new jail facility, purchase vehicles and equipment; or to invest
limited public funds in new interoperable computer systems. Central data collection is a
secondary purpose for e-warrants systems. State and local law enforcement agencies
require a more tactical approach aimed at maximum local utility; whereas NCIC utilizes
the central repository approach, which is data collection with less emphasis on local
expediency.

32
Theoretical Framework for E-Warrants and IJIS
In this section IJIS is examined through the conceptual lenses of stakeholder
theory, open systems theory, and service-oriented architecture (SOA) theory.
Stakeholder Theory: A Framework for E-Warrants
According to Zakhem, Palmer, and Stoll (2008), stakeholder theory was first
presented as a comprehensive and formal management theory by R. Edward Freeman in
his seminal work Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach in 1984 (p. 16).
Freeman himself traces the word stakeholder back to the Stanford Research Institute in
1963 when it was used in an internal memorandum (Freeman, 1984). Stakeholder theory
is an ethics-based management theory that holds that organizations should make
decisions on behalf of all their stakeholders, not just their owners (or stockholders).
Consequently, stakeholder management ultimately benefits the organization by sustaining
critical partnerships, forming operational networks, and serving society with efficiency,
fairness, respect, and integrity, while creating value for all stakeholders (Freeman, 2008,
pp. 83-86). As with most management theories, stakeholder theory is stated in the
language of business organizations. Recently, scholars have entered stakeholder theory in
to the dialog of public sector management. Fedorowicz, Gogan, and Culman (2010)
suggested that “when stakeholder concerns are identified and acted upon, a public-sector
organization can increase its effectiveness” (p. 327). It is logical to apply the central
theoretical tenets of stakeholder theory to the public sector, the criminal justice system
and electronic warrants. Flak and Rose (2005) posited that the growing forces of
e-government increases the need for public agencies to apply stakeholder theory to policy
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decision making, and they advance a research framework that includes the proposition
“Respecting stakeholders' interests can lead to improved e-government projects.
Moreover, an ethical response to stakeholder e-government interests makes an agency
reliable and trustworthy, thereby increasing its political credibility” (Flak & Rose, 2005,
pp. 656-657). The various government agencies, including the courts, law enforcement,
and corrections are in a partnership network in the public trust. Citizen taxpayers expect
government agencies to collaborate for public safety and economies of investment. This
sentiment has grown in the aftermath of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks on America. The 9/11
Commission report states:
The culture of agencies feeling they own the information they gathered at
taxpayer expense must be replaced by a culture in which the agencies instead feel
they have a duty to the information—to repay the taxpayer’s investment by
making that information available (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, 2004, p. 417).
Stakeholder theory applied in the government context extends beyond the profit
motive into the moral imperative of public service (Stoltzfus, 2009, p. 91). Thus
individual nodes of the network (i.e., law enforcement agencies) should act
collaboratively to serve the societal cause of justice, and information sharing between
agencies should be the norm.
Figure 1 is a stakeholder network model that depicts a central law enforcement
agency (LEA) with an electronic warrant information system. Warrant data are sent to
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and received from partner agencies and courts which may result in improved public
safety.
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Figure 1. Stakeholder network model.
Fedorowicz et al. (2010) applied a typology of stakeholders in collaborative data
sharing, wherein participants are typed by their role in the data exchange: data controller,
data subject, data provider, and secondary stakeholders (pp. 319-320). With regards to
e-warrants, the data controller is normally the law enforcement executive (police chief or
sheriff); the subject is the criminal suspect named in the warrant; the data providers
include courts (judges) and law enforcement agencies; and secondary stakeholders
include citizens, government agencies, and businesses.
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Stakeholder theory comports with integrated justice information systems (IJIS)
programs and electronic warrants in both government and business in the United States.
Appropriate and timely sharing of electronic warrants between criminal justice system
agencies, the courts, and other government entities adds value to each participant and the
public at large. According to Fedorowicz, Grogan, and Culnan (Fedorowicz et al., 2010),
the managerial or instrumental aspect of stakeholder theory asserts that organizational
performance and/or organizational survival would be achieved. Thus, the benefits of
e-warrants should be demonstrable. For these reasons, stakeholder theory was chosen for
this research to support the general research question: do advanced electronic warrant
systems with enhanced interoperability improve warrant service effectiveness?
Open Systems Theory and E-Warrants
According to Thompson (2003), complex organizations act according to both the
rational (closed system) model and the natural (open system) model of organizational
behavior. Thus, law enforcement agencies seek maximum internal efficiency and
competitiveness. This suggests that government officials and peace officers would
require access to all arrest warrants and criminal histories and to have this information
where and when it is needed to make critical decisions. Perfect information sharing
between agencies at all levels would likely improve effectiveness on both ends of the
exchange. Imperfect and incomplete information, due in part to poor systems
interoperability (closed systems), is a contributing factor to operational mistakes in the
Unites States’ justice system (Geerkin, 2002, pp. 9-12). Every day in the United States
law enforcement officers fail to arrest wanted persons. Judges, investigators, prosecutors,
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social workers, and other government officials decide on criminal charges, bail amounts,
deprived child placements, even jail releases without complete and accurate criminal
history information. Open systems theory suggests that a greater connectivity
(dependence) with external organizations can improve internal processes (Katz & Kahn,
1978, pp. 16-17).
Open systems theory is commonly applied to information systems architecture
and called simply open systems. An open system is an information system that shares
internal programming, system design, and architecture, with people and organizations
who wish to extend the technology or share in it its benefits, while adhering to one or
more universal technology standards. The National Association of State Chief
Information Officers supports open systems for “…the elimination of redundant data
entry, manpower savings in the retrieval and compilation of information, and technology
savings from open systems and common standards” (Geerkin, 2002, p. 1). Morton (2001,
p. 2) noted that cost savings is not an expected result of integrating justice systems, but it
should improve efficiencies and quality of operations. Roberts (2004) identified the
development of open system standards as a responsibility of government regarding
systems integration (p. 11). Regarding court information systems, Doty and Erdelez
(2002, p. 380) posited that successful implementation of court systems requires a
contextual understanding of the courts’ local environments and actors—a key tenet of
open systems theory. Thus, open systems theory was chosen as a second theoretical basis
for this research on electronic warrants.
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Service-Oriented Architecture
The emergence of e-government has given new priority to integrated justice
information system (IJIS) programs in the United States. Service-oriented architecture
(SOA) and extensible markup language (XML) technologies are at the center of an
information-sharing revolution. Law enforcement and other government agencies use
these methods and technologies to make it easier and less costly to share criminal justice
information. Natis and Schulte of Gartner, Inc., the world’s largest IT research
organization, offer this definition of SOA:
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) is a client/server software design approach in
which an application consists of software services and software service consumers
(also known as clients or service requesters). SOA differs from the more general
client/server model in its definitive emphasis on loose coupling between software
components, and in its use of separately standing interfaces. (Natis & Schulte,
2003, p. 2)
Legacy systems in the criminal justice and public safety arenas have long
included proprietary point-to-point interfaces. If information was needed from a justice
partner, a proprietary software interface would be developed under an information
sharing agreement. However, if either of the sharing entities changed database structure,
network, or development programming language, the interface would have to be changed.
Today, Internet technologies, especially web services, have driven the development of
SOA, a new way to share information that is independent of the technology at each
network node. Service-Oriented Architecture is a concept for information sharing that
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focuses on the message, not the source(s) or the endpoint technologies. Extensible
Markup Language (XML) and programmed web services are at the core of developing
standards in the justice domain. Correll (2005) identified six tenets of SOA in law
enforcement. In this tenet he describes the loose coupling and technology independence
concepts:
Law enforcement information sharing must occur across agencies that represent
divergent disciplines, branches of government, and operating assumptions. The
decentralized, loosely coupled characteristics of an SOA approach means that law
enforcement, prosecutors, defense counsel, courts, corrections, probation, and
parole can share information without sharing a common set of objectives or
funding sources. (Correll, 2005, p. 1)
Correll (2005) highlights the need to agree on the message content, not the
software or databases on either end of the exchange. This decentralized SOA approach
enables sharing of data beyond the local agencies while the information owner retains
control over who sees their information (Correll, 2005, p. 1).
Lengerich (2004) advanced a typology of five integration patterns:
1. Virtual query or portal
2. Data warehouse
3. Centralized index (lookup table)
4. Justice application suite
5. Enterprise application integration (EAI) (Lengerich, 2004, p. 5).
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EAI is the preferred architecture for integration where data ownership remains at
the source and systems do not require updating of partner systems (loosely coupled
systems). SOA is a combination of EAI as the data architecture for integration, XML, and
web services (Lengerich, 2004, p. 16).
Expectations of the public for e-government services have grown as SOA
architectures have become more commonplace in online services (e.g. shopping, travel
services, social networking, etc.) and the underlying technologies including XML, web,
services, and ad hoc wireless networks are now commonplace (Meneklis & Douligeris,
2007). The widely touted San Diego, California Automated Regional Justice Information
System (ARJIS) is successful in part due to the board of director’s decision to not replace
the many different legacy systems that contribute information, a tenet of SOA. Instead
they link to them and other systems to combine information into a single integrated
regional law enforcement application (Sawyer & Tyworth, 2005, 2006). I selected SOA
as a third theoretical lens for electronic warrants in this study because it is widely applied
in the e-government domain and IJIS.
State of Integration of Justice Information Systems in the U.S.
Intuitively, government agencies should work together to serve the citizenry,
especially where public safety is affected. The decision-making behaviors exhibited by
agencies with limited budgets and inadequate IT staff, however, do not always reflect
external thinking (Davis & Jackson, 2005, p. 36). A federal, state, or local justice agency
is, by definition, a bureaucracy. Bureaucracies operate primarily as closed systems,
organized to optimize internal tasks and insulate the internal task environment from
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external forces (Barnard, 1968). For example, a local police chief may choose to purchase
or build a new incident reporting system for the department’s officers based on features
like ease with which: (a) officers can create incident reports; (b) search for a case; or (c)
generate printed reports. Concerns for transferring police reports to the district attorney
electronically or importing call for service (911) data from the locally-operated
computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system, or even automatic external searches for active
arrest warrants on subject contacts may not even enter into the decision. Interfaces may
be seen as less important when budget pressures prevail, even if the agency executives
have the foresight to include interfaces in the system specifications. Interoperational
matters may be passively ignored because the focus is on meeting specific internal and
organizational needs. Decision making in agencies with political appointees or elected
officials may be influenced by political forces not directly aligned with the public interest
(Stoltzfus, 2009, p. 92). In larger organizations departmental thinking prevails, adding
barriers to information sharing within an agency. This problem is exacerbated when key
information transfer points cross multiple departmental boundaries, government branch
divisions, or vertical domains (local, state, tribal, and federal).
The result is a continued dependence on legacy technologies to get the job done.
Agencies may continue to make large investments in fax equipment, printers, paper, and
manual labor in lieu of electronic interfaces. The natural tendency of decision makers to
take care of core agency needs first creates a passive and unintended resistance to
electronic information sharing. These behaviors are aligned with a closed system
organizational management model, Frederick Taylor’s scientific management theory, and
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Chester Barnard’s motivational theories. The indirect rewards of a partner-stakeholder
approach to management of organizational information may be difficult to realize in
government bureaucracies.
The adoption rate for electronic warrant systems in the United States was largely
unknown before the 2011 National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and SEARCH study
of warrant and disposition management. The following results are from the
NCSC/SEARCH final report:
1. 23 out of 34 (67.6%) state respondents agree or strongly agree that the
warrant information in their state repository is complete
2. 25 of 34 (73.5%) state respondents agree or strongly agree that the warrant
information in their state repository is accurate
3. 26 of 34 (76.5 %) state respondents agree or strongly agree that the
warrant information in their state repository is timely (National Center for
State Courts & SEARCH, 2011)
The NCSC/SEARCH study is significant with respect to warrant management,
especially automatic warrant transmission:
1. 27 of 45 respondents reported automatic warrant transmission/electronic
delivery from law enforcement to the state’s central warrant repository
2. 26 of 45 respondents reported automatic warrant transmission/electronic
delivery from law enforcement directly to NCIC
3. 18 of 45 respondents reported automatic warrant transmission/electronic
delivery from courts to the state’s central warrant repository
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4. 12 of 45 respondents reported automatic warrant transmission/electronic
delivery from the courts to local law enforcement
5. 9 of 45 respondents reported automatic warrant transmission/electronic
delivery from courts to NCIC
6. 21 of 45 respondents reported automatic warrant transmission/electronic
delivery from the state’s central warrant repository to NCIC (National
Center for State Courts & SEARCH, 2011, p. 17)
As positive as the above numbers may seem, the survey instrument used does not
account for partial coverage (National Center for State Courts & SEARCH, 2011). For
example, if a state reported that the courts automatically submit warrants to NCIC, it is
not known if one, several, or all counties and court jurisdictions participate.
Morton (2001) examined three state criminal justice information sharing projects
in Colorado, Kansas, and Minnesota and found they each had different impetus,
governance, and funding sources; but all three are considered successful programs. Pardo,
Gil-Garcia, and Burke (2008) examined four state and local government criminal justice
initiatives in search of determinants of governance structure and concluded with six
propositions of cause: (1) knowledge of information; (2) knowledge of environment; (3)
willingness to accommodate diversity of organizational goals; (4) knowledge about
participating organizations; (5) legislation; and (6) executive involvement (pp. 6-8).
In a survey conducted by the Justice Research and Statistics Association, 266
criminal justice information sharing systems were identified in 35 states and Canada,
most of which were state wide designs. The study had 56 respondents from 712 contacts.
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The distribution of the identified information sharing systems were national (10%),
regional across states (11%), region in state (9%), statewide (50%), and countywide
(20%). Walbolt and Wagner did not identify whether electronic warrants were included
in each subject system (Walbolt Wagner, 2006).
In 2004 the Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) reported there
were approximately 105,000 federal law enforcement officers in 65 agencies (Reaves,
2004b). By contrast from the same year there were 732,000 commissioned officers
employed in 17,876 state and local law enforcement agencies (Reaves, 2004a). That
represents a 6.97 to 1 state and local to federal officer ratio and a 275 to 1 agency ratio.
The officer ratio is more significant than the agency ratio, because single large federal
agencies have multiple jurisdictional subdivisions.
In the latest four-year BJS survey taken in 2008 there are 17,985 state and local
law enforcement agencies; which includes state agencies, local police, sheriff’s offices,
tribal police, special jurisdictions, and constable/marshal offices; employ 765,246 sworn
personnel (Reaves, 2008a). By contrast, federal law enforcement agencies numbered 73
and employed 120,348 full-time sworn personnel (Reaves, 2008b). This represents a 6.35
to 1 numerical superiority of state and local officers to federal officers, and a 246 to 1
agency superiority over federal agencies. Noteworthy is the fact that although the federal
law enforcement agencies are outnumbered considerably, federal law enforcement gained
on state and local agencies in the four years between the studies.
The BJS reports are significant in the study of information systems for two
reasons. First, they punctuate the higher number of state and local officers, and hence
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more citizen contacts, investigations, and arrests are the norm. Second, the agency ratio
indicates that there are many more police records management systems (RMS) at the
state and local level than at the federal level. Information sharing is likely to have a
greater impact at the state and local level due to the greater number of officers, contacts
and information systems. Warrant information needs to be available to local officers,
because they are the main workforce of law enforcement in the United States. However,
it is within the smaller organizations where we find the more difficult barriers to
information sharing. Thus, we have the American criminal justice contradiction: The
greatest need for information sharing is at the local level where the funding is scarcest. A
topology of criminal justice information systems as a layered matrix of agency operated
systems is discussed in the next section.
Justice Information Systems Distribution Matrix (JISDM)
Figure 2 depicts the Justice Information Systems Distribution Matrix, a proposed
macro-organizational model of criminal justice systems. The vertical axis contains the
hierarchy of justice jurisdictions ranging from municipal to federal and international. The
horizontal axis contains a timeline of the criminal justice lifecycle beginning with
emergency dispatch and ending with post-conviction corrections and probation. Criminal
justice information systems generally operate within single segments of the criminal
justice life cycle including computer-aided dispatch (9-1-1) systems, law enforcement
records management systems (RMS), jail management systems (JMS), court case
management systems (CCMS), offender management systems (OMS), and community
service and probation programs. The Justice Information Systems Distribution Matrix
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illustrates the fragmented nature of justice information systems. Each of the horizontal
slices is duplicated hierarchically in layered jurisdictional stacks ranging from municipal
to federal and international domains. Information systems typically exist within each
agency lifecycle node (e.g. dispatch, law enforcement, etc.) and at every agency within a
horizontal level and up and down vertical levels. I developed the JISDM model in an
earlier research paper Electronic Warrants: Combining Technology and Policy for Public
Safety (Ward, 2011).
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Figure 2. Justice information systems distribution matrix (JISDM) (Ward, 2011).
The JISDM illustrates the two-dimensional nature of independent information
systems. Integration across agencies and application types (dispatch, RMS, court, etc.)
within the same level represent horizontal integration, whereas information sharing
between hierarchical levels up and down the matrix represent vertical integration (D. J.
Roberts, 2004, p. 2).
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In a post 9/11 terrorist attack analysis of federal justice and national security
information systems, the 9/11 Commission Report calls for unity of effort in sharing
information and proposed “that information be shared horizontally across new networks
that transcend agencies.” The 9/11 Commission advocated for the abolishment of the old
hub-and-spoke concept for a new decentralized model-- a trusted information network
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 418).
Another important aspect of the justice domain that is not apparent in the JISDM
is the numerical superiority of agencies, personnel, and systems at the state and local
(lower) levels of the matrix, as described in the previous section. Thus the greatest
number of information systems and potential sources of warrant information exist at the
lower levels.
Pardo and Jiang (2007) characterized the challenges of criminal justice
information system integration:
“Moreover, the difficulty that government agencies face appears to increase
proportionally with the increases in the number of boundaries to be crossed, the
number and type of information resources to be shared, and the number of
technical and organizational processes to be changed or integrated” (Pardo &
Jiang, 2007, p. 101).
This proposition becomes more important to the researcher when information
sharing efficiencies are sought. Officers in agencies positioned at the bottom of the
matrix have more opportunities to encounter warrant subjects, yet information sharing is
most challenging at this level due to the many agencies and systems involved. The
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distribution of today’s justice systems is heavily weighted in the state and local arena. Socalled low-level data sharing systems promise the greatest benefits because state and
local law enforcement make more contacts, investigate more crimes, and make more
arrests than agencies at the federal level. The greatest number of boundaries, information
resources, and organizations exist at the local and state levels; thus, both the need and the
difficulties of integration are greatest at these levels of government.
Federal Government Role and E-Warrants
The U.S. Federal Government is a major player in U.S. criminal justice systems.
A post-9/11 attack General Accounting Report from 2002 identified the challenges of
vertical and horizontal integration and refers to agency “stovepipes” of information and
cites “information failures within the FBI and CIA highlight some of the primary barriers
we face: stove-piped organizations structures, inadequate database sharing, and simple
‘turf’ issues” (Government Accountability Office, 2002, p. 8). The federal government
has for decades established centralized criminal history repositories for use by law
enforcement agencies. The FBI’s NCIC database of fugitives, missing persons, and stolen
property is shared with law enforcement agencies at all levels. The system was first
launched in 1967 and as of 2011 contained 11.7 million active records (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2011).
The FBI NCIC system is a central collection site (repository) and a hierarchical
distribution model, which depends on a long chain of information flow from the local
court or agency to the state repository to the federal repository then back down to the
local agency which needs the information in real-time to protect officers and citizens. An
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advanced e-warrant system operates on a network model where warrant information is
distributed directly to local officers within an agency and to other local agencies that
request it without requiring a long hierarchical upload/retrieval route.
E-Warrant Systems in State Government
The U.S. Department of Justice encourages state-based electronic warrant
projects, which are referred to in the federal literature as warrant repositories. These
federal programs have specific goals which are closely aligned with the purpose of this
study. The following Department of Justice program goals for state warrant repository
projects comes from a 2008 Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) sponsored report from
Texas State University titled Performance Measurement of Justice Information System
Projects (Geerkin, 2008):
1. Enhance the safety of law enforcement officers by increasing information
available to patrol officers and dispatchers
2. Improve identification and apprehension of wanted individuals by providing
more accurate and complete information to justice users
3. Reduce errors in justice process operations through improved information
sharing and management
4. Improve the time, personnel, and cost efficiency of the justice process by
automation of tasks and information sharing
5. Prevent acts of terrorism by improving information sharing and coordination
among justice agencies (Geerkin, 2008, p. 73).
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Most states have some form of a warrant system for law enforcement use;
however, the degree of sophistication of these state systems varies significantly. In the
next paragraphs, I briefly describe three examples of advanced state warrant systems in
Colorado, Kentucky, and North Carolina.
An electronic warrants system was implemented in Kentucky in 2008, and initial
results nearly a year after it was first implemented were encouraging. “More than 62
percent of the new warrants entered into the e-warrants system had been served,
compared with less than 10 percent served under the old system….the system was
originally funded with a $4.5 million General Fund appropriation” (Blanton & Midkiff,
2008, p. 1). This data was provided to the public in a press release. It is not known to
represent the results of a scientific study.
In Colorado warrants issued in court systems were linked to a statewide warrant
system for law enforcement (Perbix, 2001, p. 2). The Colorado electronic warrants
system is part of the larger Colorado Integrated Criminal Justice Information System
(CICJIS) that was started in the late 1990’s and “links together the state’s five principle
criminal justice computer systems—those for law enforcement, prosecutors, courts, adult
corrections, and juvenile corrections—using a middleware-based data-sharing
architecture” (Perbix, 2001, p. 2).
The State of North Carolina’s Warrant Repository (NCAWARE) system collects
and stores warrants, orders, citations, and summons from counties across the state and
can be accessed through a web-based statewide warrant search (North Carolina Court
System, 2010).
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These are examples of e-warrant systems implemented by states. Not all e-warrant
systems include the same levels of sophistication, interoperability, and availability; thus,
a typological framework, or maturity model, is needed to compare various systems. A
proposed maturity model for e-warrants is presented in the next section.
Analysis of Literature Related to Key Concepts
More than 100 articles, conference proceedings, and government publications
were examined for this literature review. The search for prior research specific to
electronic warrant systems was futile, but the literature contains an abundance of research
in integrated justice information systems (IJIS), which typically includes sharing of arrest
warrants by electronic means. At least 20 articles referenced warrants in context of
electronic information sharing; however, none of the peer-reviewed scholarly articles
examined contained the word “warrant” in the title or in the abstract. This research on the
efficacy of electronic warrant systems is the first of its kind.
Research Approaches Taken
A majority of the available research on IJIS was produced in the years
immediately following the 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States and came in
the form of case studies conducted by U.S. government organizations (e.g., DoJ, FBI,
etc.) and industry and government associations such as the IJIS Institute; SEARCH, the
National Consortium for Justice and Statistics; the National Center for State Courts; the
National Governors Association; the National Conference of State Legislators; and the
National Association of State Chief Information Officers. A few other sources came from
university studies, most of which were federally funded by the U.S. Department of
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Justice or the National Science Foundation. Two such federally funded research
organizations are the Center for Society, Law, and Justice at Texas State University
(Geerkin, 2008); and the Center for Technology in Government at the University of
Albany, State University of New York (Gil-Garcia, Chengalur-Smith, & Duchessi, 2007).
The predominant research method used by academic and government sources was
the qualitative multi-case study that compares and contrasts IJIS programs across the
United States. Several research articles included field interviews and surveys or used
these methods to supplement case studies.
Table 1 lists some of the most frequently cited case studies in the literature of
integrated justice information systems. The repeated use of the same project examples in
the literature suggest that few IJIS efforts have achieved significant success and/or few
government examples exist to study.
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Table 1
Integrated Justice Case Studies
System

Description

ARJIS

San Diego, California area’s Automated Regional Justice Information System
(Sawyer & Tyworth, 2006; Michael Tyworth & Steve Sawyer, 2006)

CapWIN

Capital Wireless Integrated Network; a collaboration of police, transportation,
emergency management, fire, military and homeland security agencies in the
greater Washington, D.C. area (Sawyer & Tyworth, 2005)

CJIISP

Hennepin County, Minnesota’s Criminal Justice System Information
Integration Project began in 1999 and grew into a statewide project that
retrieves information real-time from partner systems
(Gil-Garcia, Schneider, Pardo, & Cresswell, 2005)

CICJIS

Colorado Integrated Criminal Justice Information System
(D. Roberts, 2003)

CJIS

Marin County, California’s Criminal Justice Information System took seven
years to build starting in 1984 and serves a five county region (Gil-Garcia et
al., 2005)

ICJIS

Maricopa County, Arizona Integrated Criminal Justice Information Systems
(D. Roberts, 2003)

JIMS

Justice Information Management System; Harris County, Texas, started in
1977 and connects over 250 state and local agencies and 15 federal agencies
(Gil-Garcia et al., 2005)

JNET

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Justice Network
(Michael Tyworth & Steve Sawyer, 2006)

Perhaps the most studied system is the Automated Regional Justice Information
System (ARJIS) in San Diego, California. ARJIS has continued to evolve over 25 years
and features horizontal and vertical multijurisdictional integration. Horizontal integration
is established between local area municipal agency systems, and vertical integrations are
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accomplished by links to the San Diego Sheriff’s Office (county), the California
Highway Patrol (state), and the U.S. Border Patrol (federal). ARJIS serves over 10,000
law enforcement officers in more than ten agencies in the San Diego area (Sawyer &
Tyworth, 2006, p. 109).
Emerging Themes
An analysis of the IJIS literature revealed five emergent themes that inform
government practitioners seeking to maximize information sharing impact:
1. Governance. How to seek an executive sponsor, charter oversight boards, and
establish inter-branch/inter-agency agreements.
2. Critical Success Factors/Strategies. Lessons learned from the field--good and
bad to apply to future integration programs.
3. Project Management. How effective project management influences the
outcome of criminal justice integration programs.
4. Strategic Planning. Practical guidance to projects for establishing a long-term
inter-branch/inter-agency plan for integrated justice, followed by project
initiatives.
5. Maturity Stages. Evolutionary models for planning and advancing
organizational capabilities and increasing degrees of interchange effectiveness
and worth (Ward, 2010).
Theme #1: Governance. Frequently cited in the CJIS literature is the need for a
formal governance structure with a charter, organization, funding, and power sharing.
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Creswell, Pardo, and Hassan (2007) developed a capability assessment tool with 16
dimensions measured by 4 success indicators. The tool was field tested on three
integration projects. The survey found a strong agreement among managers for the
importance of governance sub-dimensions: (1) formal charter; (2) governance body; (3)
clear authority; (4) accepted authority; (5) relevant parties in government; and (6) support
(Creswell et al., 2007).
Sawyer, Fedorowicz, Tyworth, Markus, and Williams (2007) advanced a fivelevel taxonomy of public safety networks (PSN) punctuated by a heterogeneous
governance structure of successive maturity levels shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Public Safety Network Maturity Model
Maturity Level

Indicators

Level 0

No collaboration; isolated information silos

Level 1

Discuss shared issues; independent systems

Level 2

Acting collectively to procure independently owned and operated
systems

Level 3

Participate in centrally managed activities

Level 4

Collaborating and communicating on a common communication
infrastructure

Level 5

Sharing infrastructure and collaborative governance structure

Carter and Carter (2009) stressed the importance of formal partnership
agreements such as memorandums of agreement (MOA) and mutual aid pacts (MAP).
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Luna-Reyes, Andersen, Pardo, and Cresswell (2007) identified the critical role of
the program governance of the New York State Criminal Justice Information Technology
Group (CJIT). “CJIT is comprised of seven New York State criminal justice agencies and
the New York State Office of Technology” (Luna-Reyes et al., 2007, p. 48). Through a
collaboration with the Center for Technology in Government (CTG), the groups formed
an Integrated Justice Advisory Board “to develop a shared vision of the problem,
alternative solutions, and strategic priorities” (Luna-Reyes et al., 2007, p. 48).
The formal governance structure for boundary-spanning activities was a critical
success factor during the Chicago Police Department-led statewide JIS program and an
example of successful public private partnership with Oracle Corporation (Rottman,
Smith, Long, & Crofts, 2007, p. 440).
Stoltzfus (2009) prescribed the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM)
recommendations that IJIS program leaders be department heads from participating
agencies, not agency executives (Stoltzfus, p. 89).
Tyworth and Sawyer (2006) studied the critical influences of government
institutions on “the development, operation , and governance of integrated criminal
justice systems” (Michael Tyworth & Steve Sawyer, p. 107).
Theme #2: Critical success factors/strategies. Cresswell et al. (2007) developed
and field tested a capability assessment toolkit which evaluates 16 dimensions by four
success indicators. Their model was field tested on one county-level and two state-level
programs.
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A research study by Doty and Erdelez (2002) recommended four strategies: (1)
User-based empirical research; (2) Understand complex relationships between local
courts and their environment; (3) focus on internal and external users; and (4) use a
strategic approach to information initiatives.
Gil-Garcia, Schneider, Pardo, and Cresswell (2005) examined justice information
integration in Harris County, Texas JIMS, Hennepin County, Minnesota CJIISP, and
Marin County, California CJIS and elicited seven critical success factors.
Theme #3: Project management. Since the mid 1990’s formal project
management standards and best practices as prescribed the Project Management Institute
have become essential to IT projects (Project Management Institute, 2008). Next, I
describe three examples of project management’s impact in the IJIS literature.
Poor project management led to the cancellation of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Virtual Case File program after investing $170 million (Rottman et al.,
2007).
Luna-Reyes et al (2007) identified integrated justice project management risk
factors to prescribe how to effectively control them.
Lysecki (2005) reported on the failure of the 2002 Canadian Integrated Justice
Project to link the provincial justice system due in large part to a failure of project
management.
Theme #4: Strategic planning. Creswell, et al (2007)and Gil-Garcia, et al.
(2005) and Webster (2004) recognized that strategic planning, not tactical thinking, was
vital to long-term IJIS program success.
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Stoltzfus (2009, p. 93) proposed a complex model for government information
integration with strategic planning as a central element.
Theme #5: Maturity stages. Siau & Long (2009, p. 100) cataloged and
contrasted five industry models of e-government stages, and (Sawyer et al., 2007)
developed a five-stage taxonomy of public safety networks (PSN) described earlier.
Barriers and Success Strategies
Gil-Garcia’s research into several large integrated justice programs (2005) has
resulted in a valuable set of information for the criminal justice practitioner. Final
analysis of the subject case study systems yielded a list of four common barriers to
integration and seven strategies to overcome them. Integration barriers include:
1. Turf and resistance to change;
2. IT and data incompatibility;
3. Organizational diversity and multiple goals; and
4. Environmental and institutional complexity (Gil-Garcia et al., 2005, pp. 3-4).
With awareness of the above barriers, government IT executives should employ
Integration Strategies identified by Gil-Garcia (2005) to mitigate these barriers:
1. Retain autonomy of the involved agencies;
2. Establish and exercise a governance structure;
3. Secure strategic partnerships;
4. Build on long-range and comprehensive planning;
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5. Build understanding of the business process;
6. Secure adequate financial resources; and
7. Obtain and nurture executive leadership and legislative support (Gil-Garcia et
al., 2005, p. 8).
Summary and Conclusion
This dissertation is the first known research designed to test the efficacy of
e-warrant systems. An abundance of literature was found that concerns criminal justice
information sharing. Federal agencies have advocated for the societal benefits of
e-warrants and justice data sharing for decades with little scholarly evidence of the
factors that improve warrant service times and percent warrants served.
The research field of integrated criminal justice information systems is dominated
by U.S. Government projects and federally funded academic and industry programs;
however, no research was found that specifically investigated the societal impact and
value of electronic warrant systems. Case studies of crimes that might have been
prevented by sharing criminal justice data, especially arrest warrants, provide anecdotal
evidence that more of these systems are needed in the United States today.
Stakeholder theory, open systems theory, and service-oriented architecture
provide a theoretical foundation for the technologies used in advanced criminal justice
information systems. Extant technologies that facilitate justice information system
interoperability include NIEM, XML, and service-oriented architecture (SOA).
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The body of IJIS literature consists of predominantly qualitative case studies of a
few high-visibility IJIS programs including ARJIS (San Diego, California), CapWIN
(Washington, D.C.), CJIISP (Hennepin County, Minnesota), CICJIS (Colorado), CJIS
(Marin Co., California), ICJIS (Maricopa Co. Arizona), JIMS (Harris County, Texas),
and JNET (Pennsylvania). Five themes were identified in the literature to improve IJIS
project success: (1) governance; (2) critical success factors; (3) project management; (4)
strategic planning; and (5) evolutionary maturity stages. Common sense would suggest
that there are benefits to these programs, but the case studies do not contain empirical
evidence of the factors that result in improving warrant service times.
Despite the widespread promotion by the U.S. Department of Justice, other
federal agencies and industry organizations, and numerous IJIS case studies, scientific
studies are needed to justify the investment of U.S. taxpayer treasure in electronic
warrant systems. Chapter 3 contains the quantitative research design that I used to
investigate the public value proposition of e-warrant systems and to begin to fill the gap
in the literature.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this quantitative study was to validate or refute assertions of
government and industry associations that more advanced e-warrant systems produce
improved arrest results as measured by the dependent variables mean service days and
percent warrants served.
This chapter contains detailed descriptions of the research method that was used
in this quantitative study of historical warrant data. The sections that follow include
discussions on study design and rationale, methodology, threats to validity, ethical issues,
and a summary.
Research Design and Rationale
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The study research questions and corresponding hypotheses from Chapter 1 are
repeated here for reader convenience and to comply with Walden University
requirements.
1A.

To what extent does the use of electronic warrant systems result in shorter
mean service days than the use of legacy paper-based warrant systems?

1B.

To what extent does the use of electronic warrant systems result in greater
percent warrants served than the use of legacy paper-based warrant
systems?

2A.

How does the mean service days compare between the two systems for
each case type?
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2B.

How does the percent warrants served compare between the two systems
for each case type?

H01A: Mean service days will be equal for both values of warrant system type.
Restated, the mean service days for warrants during the multiyear period will be equal in
the two sheriff’s agencies.
Ha1A: Mean service days will not be equal for both values of warrant system type.
H01B: Percent warrants served will be equal for both values of warrant system
type. Restated, the percent warrants served for warrants during the multiyear period will
be equal in the two sheriff’s agencies.
Ha1B: Percent warrants served will not be equal for both values of warrant system
type.
H02A: Mean service days will be equal in both systems for all values of case type.
Mean service days for similar case types (felony, misdemeanor, traffic, etc.) will be equal
between the two compared systems.
Ha2A: Mean service days will not be equal for both systems for all values of case
type.
H02B: Percent warrants served will be equal in both systems for all values of case
type. In other words, percent warrants served for similar case types (felony,
misdemeanor, traffic, etc.) will be equal between the two compared systems.
Ha2B: Percent warrants served will not be equal in both systems for all values of
case type.
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Research Variables
The dependent variables from the study purpose were mean service days (MSD)
and percent warrants served (PWS). MSD was a calculated difference between warrant
issued date (WID) and warrant served date (WSD) for warrant record spanning the
historical period of study. Subscripts 1 and 2 denote each agency’s data.
Thus,
∑𝑛1(𝑊𝑆𝐷1,𝑛 − 𝑊𝐼𝐷1,𝑛 )
𝑀𝑆𝐷1 =
𝑛
and
𝑀𝑆𝐷2 =

∑𝑛1(𝑊𝑆𝐷2,𝑛 − 𝑊𝐼𝐷2,𝑛 )
𝑛

where n is the number of served warrant records in the sample. WSD and WID
represent date fields in warrant records and are not independent variables.
The second dependent variable, PWS, was computed by dividing total warrants
served (TWS) by total warrants served (TWS) plus total active warrants (TAW);
therefore, recalled, held, and returned unserved warrants were not counted.
Thus,
𝑃𝑊𝑆1 =

𝑇𝑊𝑆1
× 100
𝑇𝑊𝑆1 + 𝑇𝐴𝑊1
And

𝑃𝑊𝑆2 =

𝑇𝑊𝑆2
× 100
𝑇𝑊𝑆2 + 𝑇𝐴𝑊2

63
Selecting independent variables for this study presented a challenge. Without
looking at the database schemas (structures) of the selected warrant systems, it was
impossible to ensure that determinant data fields existed in all systems and that they were
populated. This risk was identified in the research proposal. Walden University’s
research policy prohibits researchers from first examining the data schema before the
proposal is approved (Walden IRB Application, 2010). After proposal acceptance, I
received warrant data extracts from the donor state court administration office. Upon
examination of the data, a design change became necessary; therefore, I used two
separate sections to describe the research design, first as approved in the proposal, then as
modified after data collection.
Initial research variable design. The independent variables initially selected for
this study were:
1. Warrant system type
2. Case type
3. Bond Amount (covariate)
Figure 3 depicts the study variables selected in the proposal design. Warrant
system type was a binary nominal independent variable and had a domain of two possible
values: 1 for system type (county) #1 and 2 for system type (county) #2.
Case type indicated the legal category of the arrest warrant, which may vary from
court to court and system to system, but generally there are felony warrants,
misdemeanor warrants, traffic warrants, failure to appear warrants, and failure to pay
warrants. Thus, case type was a categorical or nominal independent variable with a fixed
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discrete set of values. The actual case types used by the subject counties are described in
the final research variable section.
Bond amount is a common attribute of warrant records and indicates the amount
that must be paid to the court to guarantee the subject’s court appearance. In many courts,
judges assign a bond amount to a warrant reflecting the severity of the alleged crime and
the perceived flight risk. Generally speaking, the more severe the crime, the higher the
bond will be. Bond amount was expected to be an inverse covariate on the dependent
variables MSD and PWS. As such, the influence of bond amount on the dependent
variables might be cancelled out using an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) statistical
test to reveal the effects of the other two independent variables on the dependent
variables. For very serious charges, a judge may stipulate a no bond warrant, indicating
that the accused cannot bond out of jail and must remain in custody until a court
appearance or other court order. The plan for this independent variable was to use the
actual numeric dollar amount of the bond, substituting a large number such as $1,000,000
for no bond warrants. I proposed to conduct a sensitivity analysis using multiple large
numbers to determine the effect.
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Warrant
System Type

Case Type

Mean Service Days
and
Percent Warrants Served

Bond Amount
(covariate)

Figure 3. Initial proposed variable model. Dependent variables MSD and PWS
are shown with independent variables warrant system type, case type, and covariate bond
amount.
Final research variables. This section contains a description of the modified
variable design that was executed in the data analysis phase of this research. When
sample data were first received, bond amount was not included with the warrant records.
Upon further inquiry, I was advised that bond amount was not a part of the warrant
records due to an established court process in that state whereby bond amounts are
assigned in a separate court hearing not associated with warrant issuance. After
consideration and consultation with my dissertation committee chair, I decided to exclude
the covariant bond amount and change from an ANCOVA statistical test to an ANOVA

66
test. Thus, two independent variables were used in this study: (a) warrant system type and
(b) case type.
Figure 4 depicts the variables used in this study. The definitions of warrant system
type and case type remain the same as previously described.

Warrant
System Type
Mean Service Days
and
Percent Warrants Served
Case Type

Figure 4. Final variable model. Dependent variables MSD and PWS are shown
with independent variables warrant system type and case type.
Special Data Considerations
Two warrant types in the collected data samples required special consideration.
First, recently issued warrants posed a challenge due to the unwanted effect of new
warrants in process. It is reasonable to expect that a high percentage of warrants will be
served within days and weeks of issuance, but if recently issued warrants were included,
many warrants that are about to be served will be counted as not served, thus skewing the
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results. To avoid this, warrants issued less than 1 year prior to the date of data extract
were excluded from data analysis.
The second warrant category requiring special consideration was inactive or
closed warrants that were never served. Courts use a variety of terms to describe these
warrants that are no longer active: recalled, vacated, quashed, administratively closed,
held, or suspended. The warrant records used in this study were marked with one of five
warrant status values:
1. Active
2. Hold
3. Recalled
4. Retuned Served
5. Returned Unserved
To ensure that MSD and PWS were accurately calculated, only returned served
warrant records were counted in this study. When calculating PWS, only active and
served warrants were included in the denominator.
State and local laws determine what case types are used in courts. During
proposal design prior to final data selection, there was concern that case types might be
mismatched and have to be mapped. This concern was allayed when the decision was
made to collect county warrant data from a state-wide warrant system where uniform
case types were in use.
One common type of warrant that is sometimes considered less severe than others
is the bench warrant. Bench warrants are so named because the judge issues them from
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the bench usually for violation of instructions to appear in court or to pay fines and costs
or possibly for in-court misconduct. A bench warrant is normally issued as an adjunct to
an existing case for subsequent court violations. A common example is when an alleged
traffic offender agrees to appear in court to contest a traffic citation then fails to appear at
the agreed time and place; the judge may issue a bench warrant for the offender’s arrest.
Before seeing the warrant data, I had proposed to treat bench warrants as a warrant type;
however, when the data were made available, bench warrant was a data attribute separate
from case type. Hence, to stay true to the proposed variable design, I decided not to break
out bench warrants as a separate category for analysis. The data used in this study
included bench warrants and other types of warrants.
Research Design
The conventional wisdom of the justice industry and government is that more
advanced warrant systems should result in faster arrest times and decreased warrant
backlogs. The four research questions framed a scientific inquiry of this notion. To
answer these questions, a comparative study between two or more warrant systems of
different maturity was needed. Anecdotal testimony of the benefits of advanced e-warrant
systems by government bureaucrats, although interesting, does not represent empirical
scientific evidence to the claims. A quantitative head-to-head historical study of two or
more systems was required to investigate the research questions.
Because this was a study of historical data, timing constraints for data collection
were different from a survey collection method; however, timing played a part in internal
construct validity. Two time-related elements were critical: (a) historical time period and
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(b) equal time periods. The selected systems needed to have a sufficiently long period of
parallel operation to increase statistical validity. Ultimately data for the 2-year period
from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2013 was chosen to meet these criteria. An in-depth
discussion of timeframe selection is contained in Chapter 4.
Methodology
Population
The target population of this quantitative research was all law enforcement
agencies in U.S. counties that are comparable to the agencies selected for warrant data
sampling. The goal was to generalize the study results to agencies with similar technical
and environmental attributes. A description of the subject county populations and a
discussion of other attributes are contained in Chapter 4.
Procedure for Identifying Relevant Historical Data
Identifying warrant systems for comparative analysis required a method for rating
system sophistication and a method for case selection. I defined custom procedures for
system maturity rating and selection in this section.
E-warrant maturity model. It was necessary to establish a method for
categorizing computerized warrant systems for comparison and selection of cases. As an
aid to further research in electronic warrants, I proposed a comprehensive five-level
maturity model for describing an organization’s level of warrant system sophistication
and interoperability. Table 3 and the follow-on description section contain a revised
version of the E-warrant Maturity Model (EWM2) first drafted in my earlier paper
Electronic warrants: Combining technology and policy for public safety (Ward, 2011).
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This model incorporates a cumulative scale of key system functions ranging from simple
manual processes to advanced passive automation features. The next subsections contain
the criteria and describe the methods of operation for the five levels of EWM2.
Table 3
E-warrant Maturity Model (EWM2)
Feature

Level 0:
Manual

Level 1:
Captured

Level 2:
Automated

Level 3:
Published

Level 4:
Integrated

Electronic warrant
record

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Searchable fieldlevel data

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Automated
workflow

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Electronic signature

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

NIEM standard
schema

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

Publish/subscribe
external systems

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

NCIC synch.

No

No

No

No

Yes

Passive search

No

No

No

No

Yes

Level 0: Manual (Paper and Fax). Level 0 represents the unimproved method of
warrant management. At this level courts issue warrants on paper that are couriered or
faxed to the law enforcement agency, where workers file them in cabinets. To initiate a
warrant search, the field officer must make the request, usually via police radio
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dispatcher or records clerk, who physically searches the paper files for an active warrant
for the subject person. When a warrant is fulfilled by the subject or recalled by a judge,
workers rout another paper document to the law enforcement agency (LEA) warrants
section to request removal of the paper warrant. Warrant teams carry paper copies of
warrants for field identification of subjects. Every step in the level 0 process incurs a time
delay and is subject to human error. Because level 0 systems are fully manual paperbased processes, level 0 systems are not considered e-warrant systems for the purposes of
this study.
Level 1: Captured. A level 1 e-warrant is an electronic record of a court order of
arrest. At this level the basic warrant information such as defendant name, address,
descriptors, and criminal charges are entered and stored in fields in a computer
information system database. level 1 e-warrants are searchable and contain basic status
information such as Requested/Active/Denied/Recalled/Served status along with request
date, issue date, action date, judge identifiers, and officer identifiers. Level 1 Warrants
are found in most police records management systems (RMS) today. The level 1
e-warrant system does not include an automated workflow process or electronic
signatures. Level 1 e-warrants do not replace the signed paper document—they
supplement the court paper for searching and status information. A level 1 e-warrant is
not a legal court record. Having separate legal hardcopy documents and electronic
records introduces the potential for erroneous information due to an imperfect update
process. For example, a judge may recall a warrant electronically, leaving paper copies in
files. Having duplicate records imposes a tedious manual task on record keepers to recall

72
paper warrants. This is why many law enforcement records departments must check their
warrants database first then verify the warrant status by finding the legal paper warrant in
a file cabinet.
Level 2: Automated. At this intermediate level the e-warrant replaces the paper
document and wet ink signature with a fully-attributed and well-structured data record.
The level 2 e-warrant system utilizes automated workflow processes with electronic
signatures. The system also enables printing of a facsimile court document. At this level,
e-warrants are expected to show internal benefits to the agency such as shortened arrest
times, improved arrest records, more reliable warrant status, and instant availability to the
field officer within the issuing jurisdiction. Today many leading commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) police record management system (RMS) vendors include a level 2 e-warrant
capability with their application system.
Level 3: Published. The level 3 warrant system adds to the functions of level 2 by
extending warrant access to external agencies. Using technologies such as extensible
markup language (XML), National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) design, and
service-oriented architecture (SOA) the agency or court officials publish their warrants to
neighboring counties, municipalities, or states. Outside agencies can opt-in to subscribe
their internal information systems to the publishing agency’s warrants, thereby extending
the reach of the warrant.
Level 4: Integrated. At the top of the e-warrant stack is level 4. The level 4
e-warrant represents the highest degree of system sophistication, including all the features
of levels 1 through 3 warrants plus passive system interoperability. This definition
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requires that: (a) officers in the field can search and view warrants electronically; (b)
warrants are searchable by authorized external agencies; and (c) an automatic “push”
method of information sharing is implemented with other criminal justice system(s).
Level 4 e-warrant systems utilize fully conformant NIEM data exchanges. Few, if any,
electronic warrant systems that are in use today achieve maturity level 4 due to
interoperability requirements. A level 4 system promises the greatest potential value for
improving public safety. A few highly advanced warrant systems have additional features
including: (1) online return of service entry by law enforcement, (2) automatic
asynchronous NCIC wanted person lookup; (3) automatic NCIC adds, updates, and
clearance; and (4) warrant history on subject (closed warrants).
Case selection methodology. This section contains a case selection methodology
that I developed as part of my research proposal prior to receiving data samples and prior
to expanding the scope of study from a single pair of counties to four county pairs. The
E-warrant Maturity Model (EWM2) can be employed in a case selection methodology to
identify suitable warrant systems for comparison. I first developed this case selection
methodology in a prior research paper Knowledge Area Module (KAM) #7 titled The
Case Study Research Method (Ward, 2013b). I adopted the Case Selection Variable Map
(Figure 5) and the Case Selection Process Flow Chart (Figure 6) from that paper for this
dissertation as originally intended.
This method is designed to select two candidate cases with a maximum absolute
value of difference (M2-M1), where Mn is the maturity level of candidate case n. The
EWM2 utilizes a scale from 1 to 4, but for purposes of this paper, level 3 and 4 systems
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are considered mature e-warrant systems. As such, I attempted to identify one system
with a 3 or 4 level rating and a second system with a significantly lower maturity rating.
My goal was to select two cases with significantly different maturity levels (electronic vs.
mostly manual), but with similar environmental variables and system history.
Candidate warrant system environmental variables of research interest were:
1. Jurisdiction type (JT)
2. Population served (P)
3. Size of force (SF)
4. Level of cooperation (C)
Candidate warrant system technical variables of research interest were:
1. E-warrant system maturity level (M)
2. Years with current warrant system (SY)
3. Case types (CT)
A definition of the environmental variables is contained in the following paragraphs.
Years with current warrant system (SY). This is the number of years the law
enforcement agency has been using the warrant system and was used to select matching
warrant record date ranges for case comparison. The goal was to find two or more cases
(systems) that contained warrants for the same recent number of years.
Jurisdiction type (JT): federal, state, county, municipal, or tribal. It is essential
that both cases selected are the same jurisdiction type. In most states the county sheriffs
are responsible for tracking and servicing arrest warrants. When municipal police or other
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agencies arrest on a state warrant, the county warrant system is typically updated to
indicate the arrest.
Population served (P): Indicates population served by the law enforcement agency
which is responsible for administering and serving warrants. To strengthen internal
validity of the follow-on data analysis after case selection, the selected cases should have
similar populations. In other words, it would not be useful to compare a sheriff’s office in
a rural county with 50,000 people to a metropolitan county with a population of one
million.
Case types (CT): Indicates what types of warrants are tracked in the system.
Special public safety interest is given to felony, misdemeanor, and traffic warrants.
Failure to appear warrants may also have a public safety component, depending upon the
original charges. Consideration was given to congruency of case types between systems.
This is discussed in the Special Data Considerations section earlier in this chapter.
Size of force (SF): This is the number of commissioned peace officers in the law
enforcement agency which tracks warrants. The size of the force may affect warrant
service. A small force may be less capable of servicing warrants than a larger force in a
similar sized county. Similar SFs will add to internal validity of the subsequent data
analysis.
Level of cooperation (C): This factor reflects the participating organization’s
ability and willingness to share data for research. A contributing factor to an agency’s
willingness to share data is resource availability. Law enforcement agencies may have
limited funding and personnel to work on these special requests. Often they must rely on
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officers with limited technical skills, technical experts in a separate county information
technology group, or even vendor personnel to carry out information requests of this
nature as time and resources allow.
Figure 5 depicts a case selection variable diagram which depicts independent
variables and intermediate variables for environmentally qualified (E) and technically
qualified (T) candidate cases which, in turn, determine overall qualification for study
inclusion (Q).
Four-step case selection process. Selecting cases for a quantitative comparative
study of historical warrant data requires an agile and iterative four-phased process: (1)
identify; (2) qualify on environmental variables; (3) qualify on technical variables; and
(4) select final test cases. Figure 6 contains a flow chart of the process. A narrative
describing the four main steps follows the diagram.
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JT:
Jurisdiction Type

PS:
Population
served

E:
Environmentally
Qualified

SF:
Size of Force

LC:
Level of
Cooperation
Q:
Qualified For Study

ML:
E-warrant system
Maturity level

SY:
Years with
current warrant
System

T:
Technically
Qualified

WT:
Warrant Types

Figure 5. Case selection variable map. Depicts independent, intermediate, and dependent
variables and determinants; adapted from Ward (2013).
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Start

1. Identify
Candidate Warrant
Systems

No
No

Identified
enough (2+)
candidate
systems?
Yes
Have more
identified
candidate
warrant
systems?

No

Yes

2. Qualify Systems
on Environmental
Variables

Qualified enough
(2+) candidate
systems?

No

Yes
Have more
environmentally
qualified
systems?

No

Yes

3. Qualify Systems
on Technical
Variables

Qualified enough
(2+) systems?

Yes

4. Select Best Two
Systems for
Quantitative Study

Finish

Figure 6. Case selection process flow chart. Depicts sequence and logic used in case
selection process (Ward, 2013).
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Most states operate some form of an electronic warrant system (National Center
for State Courts & SEARCH, 2011, pp. 13-17). They vary widely in age, technology, and
functionality. As an information technology professional who has worked in the criminal
justice field for many years, I had become aware of several state systems. Initial
qualifying included Internet-based research of news, government, and industry web sites
and publications; and contacting peers and associates across the country. The goal of this
first step was to identify two or more candidate systems that might meet the
environmental and technical requirements, not to survey the entire country for candidate
systems.
The second step was to qualify candidate cases based on the four environmental
variables JT, PS, SF, and LC. This step involves gathering environmental information for
each candidate and comparing to other candidates. The step is complete when two or
more candidate systems are found to be similar to each other within acceptable margins.
Similar values in all environmental variables will strengthen internal validity. At proposal
time this process model had an additional variable called state repository. This variable
was dropped from the process when it was decided later that all county samples where to
come from a single state with a state warrant repository; thus, rendering it a moot factor.
This qualifying step was repeated until all known candidate cases have been evaluated on
the environmental variables. The process was designed to be continued until two or more
environmentally similar cases were found. If all candidates are determined to be
incompatible, then step #1 had to be repeated.
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The third step in the selection process required an in-depth look at
environmentally similar candidate systems that passed step #2. The three system
variables (ML, SY, and WT) were examined to determine suitability for use in a
quantitative analysis of historical warrant data. To strengthen internal validity, candidate
systems must have available data for the same time period of time longer than one year.
Ultimately this meant that candidate systems must have substantially different maturity
levels and compatible system ratings. Steps 1 through 3 were iterated individually as
necessary to yield at least two candidate cases.
The fourth and final step in the process was to choose the best two or more cases
from the results of step 3.
This section detailed the method proposed for identifying two or more warrant
systems for comparative analysis in this study. Chapter 4 contains a description of the
final selection process that resulted in six counties in four matched pairs.
Procedures for Obtaining Permissions to Use Historical Data
A state administrative office of the courts (AOC) owned the warrant data
collected from the six selected counties, which simplified the data permission and
acquisition process. A formal data use agreement was executed with the state AOC.
Following a successful oral defense of my proposal with my dissertation supervisory
committee, the Walden University Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and
approved my proposed data collection methods and data analysis. Data collection began
after IRB approval.
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Retrieving Historical Data
Warrant data is maintained by government organizations, generally courts and
law enforcement agencies; thus these are the most reliable sources available. Other
systems such as NCIC are incomplete and latent secondary sources for warrant data. It is,
however, important to evaluate the quality of any data selected by learning how it was
collected and how it is maintained. The case selection method described earlier in this
chapter details how candidate systems can be qualified on several environmental and
technical variables. The six systems are suitably disparate in degrees of sophistication,
based on the electronic warrant maturity model (EWM2), and they are comparable in
population and other environmental variables.
Prior to final selection, I had planned to examine the data base schemas and
develop structured query language (SQL) to extract the study datasets from each agency’s
warrant system. To protect the security interests of the donor agencies, I expected to ask
the IT organization in each agency to run the SQL queries that I send them via email.
Instead, the AOC IT organization was not willing to share the database schema and
developed the extract SQL internally. No personal identifiers on the warrant subjects
were included in database extracts; thus protecting the security interests of the system
owners and the privacy of warrant subject persons. Notably, arrest warrant information is
generally public information, but some jurisdictions limit bulk data requests. I received
the warrant dataset extracts in Microsoft Excel format via email attachments which I later
imported into IBM SPSS for analysis. Chapter 4 contains a detailed description of the
data collection and analysis processes used in this study.

82
Method of Analysis
I conducted two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistical tests on each
county set as the primary method of analysis. I used IBM SPSS statistical software on my
personal computer to test the independent variables for individual and combined effects
on the dependent variables. A p statistic value less than .05 was selected as the statistical
significance level for the independent variables. I also ran descriptive statistics; including
means, medians, standard deviations, and ranges; on all variables to compare historical
datasets and subgroups (e.g., case type).
Contingency Method of Analysis
During the data analysis, tests for two-way ANOVA assumptions were run on the
sample data sets. Most assumptions were found to be false; therefore, it was necessary to
resort to follow-on non-parametric SPSS tests on both dependent variables. A further
explanation of these tests and the results are contained in Chapter 4.
Threats to Validity
Threats to External Validity
One significant threat to external validity was that only six systems were
examined in this study. While thousands of records were analyzed for each of the
selected systems, the question of generalizability to other systems was dependent largely
upon environmental similarities such as population served, size of force, and other
variables as shown previously in Figure 5.
Another potential threat to generalization of results is the variability of warrant
system maturity as defined previously in the E-warrant Maturity Model (EWM2). The
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results of this study should not be loosely generalized to any two warrant systems of any
maturity level. For example, this study compares level 0 or level 1 warrant system to
level 3 warrant systems, and the results may not be valid when comparing a level 3 and a
level 4 system, for example. Generalizations should be limited to systems with the same
maturity levels. Indeed, one possible follow-on study approach would be to analyze
several systems of all maturity levels looking for consistent results and a possible
impactful threshold. For example, it may be discovered that systems of level 3 or higher
roughly equally outperform lower rated systems.
Threats to Internal Validity
Creswell (2009) defines threats to internal validity as “…experiments procedures,
treatments, or experiences of the participants that threaten the researcher’s ability to draw
correct inferences from the data about the population in an experiment” (J. W. Creswell,
2009, p. 162). Eight of the ten types of threats to internal validity pertain only to
experiments involving participants or experimental treatments. The two remaining
procedural threats are testing and instrumentation (J. W. Creswell, 2009, pp. 162-164).
Since participants and testing were not used in this study, this leaves only instrumentation
threats to internal validity. Instrumentation normally deals with variations in the
instrument used. In this study historical data are used, and the internal threats to validity
relate to quality of source data (i.e., instrumentation errors are built in to the historical
datasets).
As a practitioner of criminal justice computer information systems and a
commissioned law enforcement officer, I am interested in improving arrest rates;
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however, I have designed this study using historical data sets, which does not allow for
influencing the study with survey bias or participant selection biases.
Threats to data quality come in several forms. Loshin and Russom enumerate
eight characteristics of quality data: uniqueness; accuracy; consistency; completeness;
timeliness; currency; conformance; and referential integrity (as cited in Hoffer et al.,
2013, pp. 438-439). Consistency, accuracy and completeness are the most likely threats
to data quality. An in-depth discussion of data quality and limitations is contained in
Chapter 5.
To establish consistency between two systems, the same time period of operation
must be used, and the time period must be sufficiently long to dampen the effects of
external variations such as economy, weather, political influences, and legal mandates. I
settled on a two-year time frame for warrant performance comparison of the four county
pairs. An explanation of the time frame selection is contained in Chapter 4.
Factors affecting accuracy of data include: method of data capture; data validation
rules used; and quality assurance procedures. Data completeness may be a threat if some
of the warrant data were not captured uniformly across counties.
Threats to Construct or Statistical Validity
Construct validity is a measure of how effectively the research design addresses
the research questions, or as Trochim (2001) stated, “construct validity refers to the
degree to which you are measuring what you intended to measure” (Trochim, 2001, p.
105). Given that the independent variables were selected prior to knowing the data
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schemas, there was a risk that the variables did not exist in a usable form, but no such
problem was found. There are no other known threats to statistical validity.
Ethical Procedures
Protection of Confidential Information
This study of historical data does not include direct participants or a survey
instrument. Instead, warrant data records on wanted persons are the source of analysis. In
the United States criminal justice system, arrest warrant records are generally considered
public information; however, identifying individual warrant subjects is not germane to
this study, and therefore I excluded this type of information from sample datasets.
Personal identifiers such as name, address, date of birth, social security number,
employer, next of kin, phone numbers, etc. were not extracted from the source systems.
The file extracts used contained all the detail needed for research, but did not include
individual identifiers. All data collected remains on my personal computer equipment and
backup systems, including a secure cloud-based backup service (Carbonite) and Google
Drive. All applicable Walden Institutional Review Board (IRB) procedures were
followed.
Summary
This chapter contains a description of the research method used in this
quantitative study of historical arrest warrant records extracted from six law enforcement
agencies. I used a custom-designed case selection process to qualify candidate systems
with similar technical and environmental attributes but with significantly different
e-warrant maturity levels, as determined using a proposed e-warrant maturity model
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(EWM2). Analysis was performed using descriptive statistics, analysis of variance
(ANOVA), and non-parametric tests on two dependent variables, MSD and PWS, and
two independent variables, warrant system type and case type. Privacy of human warrant
subjects was fully protected by excluding all personal identifiers from source data
extracts prior to data analysis.
Chapter 4 contains a detailed accounting of the research study outcome, including
sections on data collection, study results, and study findings.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to examine whether the use of advanced e-warrant
systems improves arrest results as measured by the dependent variables MSD and PWS.
These advanced e-warrant systems are aimed at improving arrest performance, thus
improving public safety. The federal government and the criminal justice community
advocate for more advanced electronic warrant systems that share data with other
agencies. The independent variables that were examined in this study are WST and case
type.
The four research questions of this study were
1A.

To what extent does the use of electronic warrant systems result in shorter
MSD than the use of legacy paper-based warrant systems?

1B.

To what extent does the use of electronic warrant systems result in greater
PWS than the use of legacy paper-based warrant systems?

2A.

How does the MSD compare between the two systems for each case type?

2B.

How does the PWS compare between the two systems for each case type?

Questions 1A and 1B were about the overall effect of the different system types
on total arrest performance for the agency. Questions 2A and 2B were designed to drilldown to compare arrest performance by individual case type.
This study was based on four null hypotheses, one for each research question:
H01A: MSD will be equal for both values of WST. Restated, the MSD for warrants
during the multiyear period will be equal in the two sheriffs’ agencies.
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H01B: PWS will be equal for both values of WST. Restated, the PWS for warrants
during the multiyear period will be equal in the two sheriffs’ agencies.
H02A: MSD will be equal in both systems for all values of case type. In other
words, MSD for similar case types (felony, misdemeanor, traffic, etc.) will be equal
between the two compared systems.
H02B: PWS will be equal in both systems for all values of case type. In other
words, PWS for similar case types (felony, misdemeanor, traffic, etc.) will be equal
between the two compared systems.
This chapter contains the data analysis results organized into sections including
Data Collection, Data Quality, and Study Results.
Data Collection
Data collection was a significant and time-consuming effort due to difficulties in
data extraction and resource limitations of the donor state court organization. The
proposed research design called for data from only two counties with similar populations,
court processes, and environmental factors: one basis county that did not use an e-warrant
system and another that did. An accounting for the data search, selection, and quality
follows in the next sections.
The Search for Historical Warrant Data
My research for the literature review and my personal contact with criminal
justice industry consultants led me to the conclusion that the best chance of finding
counties with similar environments would be to look at states that had implemented, or
were implementing, a state-wide e-warrants system for use by county sheriffs. The search
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narrowed to three known state wide e-warrant systems. One state did not respond to my
requests for data. A second state had employed a less advanced system with limited
county participation. Court officials in the final remaining state pledged to provide data
for this study. I received verbal approval from the state court’s administrative office of
the courts director and the state courts IT director. A data use agreement was soon
executed, and then lengthy telephone discussions and e-mail exchanges led to the
selection of study counties from that state. The state court system had access to data from
all counties in their state, including the two counties that were not connected to the
recently implemented e-warrant system. This presented a new opportunity to expand the
study from one base (non-e-warrant) county to two base counties.
Selection of Subject Counties and Data Time Frame
County selection was based on population data retrieved from the U.S. Census
Bureau 2010 census (United States Census Bureau, 2014). The subject state court IT
department provided a schedule showing the date that each county began using the new
e-warrant system. With the names of the two counties not using the new e-warrants
system, I was able to sort a census bureau data extract by county population. The two
closest counties by population to each of the two basis counties were selected for this
study. This step yielded six selected counties in two study groups. This study population,
therefore, included all counties in the United States with rural populations similar to the
sample counties, which are approximately 21,000 and 28,000 people. The exact census
numbers are withheld to keep the identities of the subject counties confidential. Because
the sample data were provided by the state AOC, not all of the proposed selection factors
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were available to qualify each data source. Jurisdiction type was the same for all samples:
a county sheriff’s office. Population served was matched as described earlier. The size of
force and level of cooperation were not available. The number of years with the current
warrant system, while not known for the basis counties, was critical in determining the
sample data frame used. Warrant types were uniform in all county samples. System
maturity was level 3 for the four e-warrant counties, and the basis counties were
understood to be mostly manual systems at level 0 or 1, thus yielding a sufficient system
maturity difference to use in this study.
Next, the data frame selection was based on e-warrant system go-live dates that
were provided by the state. The goal was to select the longest time period of systems
usage across all six subject counties. Complete data for calendar years 2012 and 2013
were available; therefore, this became the study data frame. Another factor in time frame
selection was that it should be more than a year older than the data extract to reduce the
effect of new warrants in the system that had not been served yet simply because they
were relatively new. This condition was met because the newest warrant data were from
December 2013—more than a year prior to the date that the data was extracted.
This process yielded two basis counties each being paired with two different
counties with complete warrant data for 2 full calendar years 2012 and 2013. This
resulted in a total of four pairs of counties. Instead of the original single county pair
called for in the proposal, the scope was expanded to four pairs, essentially increasing the
study’s reliability.
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Study Population
The study population was all law enforcement agencies in U.S. counties with
similar populations to the six subject counties. There are 3,143 counties in the United
States (United States Census Bureau, 2015). I downloaded a table of U.S. county
populations from the U.S. Census Bureau to Microsoft Excel, and then sorted them by
population, and I ran ranking and descriptive statistics in Excel. The mean population for
all U.S. counties was 98,233 and the median population was 25,857. Table 4 shows how
the six subject counties are grouped into Group A and Group B. The mean and median of
the three Group A counties rounded to the nearest 1,000 was 29,000. The population
difference between the largest and smallest counties in Group A was less than 400. The
mean and median of the three Group B counties rounded to the nearest 1,000 was 21,000.
The population difference between the largest and smallest counties in Group B was less
than 200. Approximately 53% of all U.S. counties had populations lower than the Group
A counties in this study, and 43% of all counties had populations lower than Group B
counties. The six counties in this study represent typical, mostly rural, U.S. counties.
At the time of this writing, permission to use actual county names in this
dissertation had not been granted by the data owners; therefore, moniker letters were
assigned to each of the six subject counties as described in Table 4. To further ensure
anonymity, the subject state name and specific county population sizes are not revealed in
this study.
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Table 4
County Letter Assignments
Group

County Letter
Assignment

Description

A

A0

Group A Non-E-Warrants County

A

A1

Group A First E-Warrant County

A

A2

Group A Second E-Warrant County

B

B0

Group B Non-E-Warrants County

B

B1

Group B First E-Warrant County

B

B2

Group B Second E-Warrant County

The data analysis was performed on four county pairs:
1. Pair A0A1: County A0 and County A1
2. Pair A0A2: County A0 and County A2
3. Pair B0B1: County B0 and County B1
4. Pair B0B2: County B0 and County B2
Each county pair dataset was subjected to the same statistical analysis, yielding
four times the results originally set forth in the proposal.
Each pairing of counties in this research design included a basis county that did
not use an electronic warrant system (warrant system type 0), and it was designated with
a zero subscript. The second county in each pair used an electronic warrant system
(warrant system type 1), and it was designated with a subscript of 1 or 2. Thus, the
research variable WST corresponds to county, and county was used interchangeably for
WST in the remainder of this study for better understanding.
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Data Quality and Research Design
The original proposal design called for a third determinant variable, bond amount,
which was propositioned to be a possible covariant with the dependent variables.
However, as explained in Chapter 3, when the data were first received from the donor
state court system, bond amount was not included. As a result, this research design was
modified to use the two remaining independent variables and the central statistical test
changed from the two-way ANCOVA in the original proposal to a two-way ANOVA.
Sample size for each county in the 2-year time frame from January 2012 to
December 2013 ranged from 1,278 warrants to 3,874 warrants. Table 5 contains warrant
counts (served and unserved) by county and case type.
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Table 5
Warrant Counts by County and Case type (calendar years 2012 and 2013)
County

Circuit
Criminal

Felony

Misdemeanor

Traffic

Total

A0

691

519

1,661

1,551

4,422

A1

737

419

2,530

3,233

6,919

A2

456

116

684

709

1,965

B0

398

210

430

604

1,642

B1

473

174

559

708

1,914

B2

533

157

647

932

2,269

The e-warrant counties selected for each group were the two closest in census
population based on 2010 Census Bureau figures (United States Census Bureau, 2014).
Table 6 contains population difference percentages.
Table 6
Percent Population Difference from Basis County
County

Percent Difference

A0

0% (basis)

A1

+0.4%

A2

+0.4%

B0

0% (basis)

B1

+0.5%

B2

+1.6%
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Study Results
This study results section is divided into two subsections, one for each dependent
variable, MSD and PWS. Each subsection contains a discussion of two-factor ANOVA
assumptions and results, alternative nonparametric tests, hypothesis findings, and
research question results.
Study Results: Mean Service Days
Two-factor ANOVA assumption tests: Mean service days. The ANOVA test is
based on three fundamental assumptions: (a) independence of errors, (b) normal
distribution, and (c) homogeneity of variance (Gamst, Meyers, & Guarino, 2008, pp. 4960). Independence of errors is assumed to be met because the sample data were created
from independent events that occurred in different courts and sheriffs’ agencies. It is
unlikely that any significant dependencies would exist between warrants or subjects.
Outlier data points can signal a non-normal distribution. An examination of SPSS
box plots for service days in every subject county and county*case type combination
revealed many apparent outliers. This is explained by the warrant service process; some
warrants never get served, and these were intentionally omitted from the analysis. Other
warrants take years to be served. This may be due to a variety of reasons including
1. Subjects moving or evading to avoid arrest
2. Agency, court, and legislative public safety priorities
3. Limited law enforcement budgets and/or resources
4. Political will
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The six datasets examined for this study all had numerous outliers at the high end.
In other words, many warrants in each county were served long after issuance. Warrants
that are not served in the first few days after issue can become part of a back log that may
get little proactive attention from agency warrant teams as new warrants are ordered for
fresh cases. Service on an old warrant is often coincidental with unrelated contacts with
law enforcement, such as traffic stops or investigations of different crimes. Appendix A
contains box plots of unmodified service days data.
Data outliers can be handled in three basic ways: (a) trim them out of the sample,
(b) transform them by mathematical formula, or (c) ignore them (Gamst et al., 2008, p.
57). I selected a mathematical formula called Winsorizing that replaces high-end and
low-end outliers with calculated upper limit or lower limit values (Kennedy, Lakonishok,
& Shaw, 1992, p. 169). Hoaglin et al. (1986)developed a formula for identifying outliers
using statistical sample quartiles (Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4) and a factor K=2.2 (Hoaglin &
Iglewicz, 1987; Hoaglin et al., 1986):
Upper = Q3 + (2.2 * (Q3 – Q1))
Lower = Q1 – (2.2 * (Q3 – Q1)
Winsorizing is the preferred method over trimming or ignoring in this case
because the sample size N is not reduced, and the outliers are brought back into the
expected normal range. Using SPSS, I added a new data column Winsorized service days,
copied service days into it, then replaced outliers with the calculated upper limit.
Winsorized service days was used in subsequent ANOVA and non-parametric tests. The
lower limit was not applicable because there are no lower limit outliers less than 1 day,
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because law enforcement cannot serve a warrant before it is issued. I applied the same
transformations to each of the six county pair data sets.
Appendix B: Service Days Distribution contains histograms of Winsorized
service days for all data sets. The histograms reveal the asymptotic shape of the warrant
data with the highest number of warrants served just after issuance then declining steadily
over days, weeks, and months. The distributions are extremely positively skewed.
An examination of all four sample’s indicators for normal distribution yielded
consistent results for all data sets. Table 7 contains skewness indicators, Kurtosis
indicators, and Shapiro-Wilk significance indicators for all counties before and after
Winsorizing. Every skewness value was well above zero, indicating a left-heavy
positively skewed curve. All Kurtosis indicators were also above zero, indicating a higher
than normal curve stacking around the mean. A Shapiro-Wilk Significance value above
.05 indicates a normal distribution; however, all test data sets failed this normality test
with a Shapiro-Wilk significance value of zero. In summary, all data samples were not
normally distributed on the dependent variable service days. Histograms for each county
are contained in Appendix C.
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Table 7
Normal Distribution Indicators

With Outliers

Winsorized

County

Skewness

Kurtosis

Shapiro-Wilk Sig.

Skewness

Kurtosis

ShapiroWilk Sig.

A0

2.401

6.996

.000

1.745

2.532

.000

A1

1.781

2.992

.000

1.524

1.613

.000

A2

2.401

6.996

.000

1.497

0.969

.000

B0

2.938

9.739

.000

1.992

3.340

.000

B1

3.165

12.524

.000

1.903

2.916

.000

B2

2.260

5.729

.000

1.799

2.718

.000

Finally, I examined the samples for the homogeneity of variance assumption.
Gamst, Meyers, and Guarino (2008, pp. 57-58) suggested that floor or ceiling effects,
such as exists with warrants that cannot be served in less than a day, may cause large
variance in the distribution of residual errors; thus violating the homogeneity of variance
assumption. An SPSS Levene test for homogeneity of variance yielded a significance
value of .000 for all four county pair data sets. Therefore, all pairs failed the homogeneity
of variance assumption. This is attributed to the aforementioned lower floor limit of
warrants.
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Tables 8 and 9 contain means service days and standard deviations for county and
county*case type, respectively.

Table 8
County Mean Service Days and Standard Deviations
County

MSD

Standard Deviation

A0

106.01

129.20

A1

138.05

122.54

A2

50.12

65.93

B0

66.57

94.50

B1

62.95

86.79

B2

104.75

132.69
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Table 9
Mean Service Days and Standard Deviations by County*Case Type
Circuit

Felony

Misdemeanor

Traffic

County

MSD

Std.
Dev.

MSD

Std.
Dev.

MMSD

Std.
Dev.

MSD

Std.
Dev.

A0

28.19

36.04

106.34

121.65

119.66

126.52

137.00

151.15

A1

99.53

122.54

106.12

140.70

132.43

152.83

159.59

181.33

A2

37.36

52.51

53.80

67.48

55.22

72.12

54.42

67.44

B0

23.04

30.91

78.40

99.19

90.80

113.91

83.19

101.50

B1

27.27

33.35

55.47

73.41

74.96

93.38

85.56

104.99

B2

46.02

59.24

97.28

118.77

127.00

139.38

135.35

154.68

Standard deviations higher than the means are due to the long right curve tails,
and suggest that many long service times remain after Winsorization. Appendix C
contains histograms of Winsorized service days for each of the six subject counties. Table
8 highlights that each county had a high MSD and large standard deviation. For example,
County A0 had an MSD of 106.01 and a standard deviation of 129.20. Two standard
deviations from the mean is almost a year (364 days) after warrant issue date.
All sample data sets failed assumptions of normal distribution and homogeneity
of variance, even after transforming the outliers with Winsorization. Gamst, Meyers, and
Guarino (2008) found that “ANOVA is considered to be quite resilient or robust to
departures from normality” (Gamst et al., 2008, p. 56). This is especially true with large
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sample sizes such as the data sets used in this study. Rutherford stated that “as sample
size increases, test power increases and with large enough samples, virtually all tests will
have sufficient power to reject the null hypothesis (2012). Therefore, one of the test
assumptions is met (independence), another is mitigated by a large sample size (normal
distribution), and a third assumption (homogeneity) failed. While this does not require
wholesale rejection of ANOVA results, the accuracy of the findings is brought into
question. Therefore, I performed additional non-parametric tests on MSD. Before I
present non-parametric test results, I summarize the two-way ANOVA findings.
The results of the two-way ANOVA tests on MSD were mixed. A set of profile
plots for each of the four county pairs depicting MSD for every case type is contained in
Appendix D. The detailed ANOVA results are contained in Appendix F, and the results
are summarized in Table 10. To aid in reader understanding, a three color coding
convention is used in Table 10 and other similar results tables through the remainder of
this study. Green favors the use of e-warrants, yellow does not favor the use of
e-warrants, and blue means the results were not conclusive.
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Table 10
Summary ANOVA Findings for Mean Service Days by County and Case Type
County*Case Type
County
Pair

County

Circuit

Felony

Misdemeanor

Traffic

A0A1

No

No

NC

No

No

A0A2

Yes

NC

Yes

Yes

Yes

B0B1

Yes

NC

Yes

Yes

NC

B0B2

No

No

NC

No

No

Note. Yes/Green = favors use of e-warrants; No/Yellow = does not favor use of e-warrants;
NC/Blue = not conclusive.

On county alone the results were evenly split; two sample pairs favored the use of
e-warrants, and two did not. Sixteen tests of county*case type interactions resulted in five
favoring e-warrants, six not favoring e-warrants, and five tests were not statistically
significant.
Non-parametric tests for mean service days. The evenly mixed results of the
two-way ANOVA tests, suggests that other confounding factors may exist in the four
agency pairs. As discussed in relation to data outliers earlier in this section, some of the
same factors may be in play with MSD:
1. Subjects moving or evading to avoid arrest
2. Agency, court, and legislative public safety priorities
3. Limited law enforcement budgets and/or resources
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4. Political will
In an effort to mitigate potential unknown confounding factors, I decided to combine the
warrant data from the two e-warrant agencies in each group and compare the merged data
with the base (non-e-warrant) agency in the group. This resulted in reducing four groups
to two. Group A contained data from counties A0, A1,. and A2. Group B contained data
from counties B0, B1, and B2. Each new group contains three counties with very similar
populations.
To prepare the data for non-parametric testing, I added a data column, E-Warrant
Flag, and populated it with “Y” and “N” values, based on the county warrant system type.
Tables 11 and 12 contain means and standard deviations for groups and case types,
respectively.

Table 11
MSD, Median, and Standard Deviations by Group
Group

E-Warr.
Flag

MSD

Median

Std. Dev.

A

N

106.01

59.00

129.203

Y

114.83

49.00

148.802

N

66.57

23.00

94.496

Y

85.95

34.00

116.209

B

Note. Green = favors use of e-warrants; Yellow = does not favor use of e-warrants;
Blue = not conclusive.
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Table 12
MSD, Median, and Standard Deviation by Group*Case Type
Group

E-Warr.
Flag

MSD

Median

Std. Dev.

Circuit
A
B

N

28.19

12.00

36.04

Y

72.15

27.00

102.76

N

23.04

7.00

30.91

Y

37.70

14.00

50.30

Felony
A
B

N

106.34

60.00

121.65

Y

91.82

33.50

127.08

N

78.40

28.00

99.19

Y

74.05

29.00

98.24

Misdemeanor
A

B

N

119.66

76.00

126.52

Y

114.40

54.00

142.05

N

90.80

41.00

113.91

Y

102.39

49.50

122.56

Traffic
A

B

N

137.00

84.00

151.15

Y

136.36

62.00

168.89

N

83.19

37.00

101.50

Y

114.87

54.00

138.57

Note. Green = favors use of e-warrants; Yellow = does not favor use of e-warrants;
Blue = not conclusive.
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Next, I ran SPSS non-parametric tests for independent data samples. The nonparametric testing is limited to continuous variables; therefore, only Winsorized service
days was tested. The categorical variable case type and the interaction of Winsorized
service days*case type could not be tested using this method. Based on the sample data
set, I executed a Mann-Whitney U Test in SPSS. Group A had N equal to 8,727, and
Group B had N equal to 4,142. The Mann-Whitney U Test has only two required
assumptions, which are both met in this study: (a) the samples must be random samples
from the two populations; and (b) the samples are drawn independently of each other
(Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2009, p. 633). The test results for groups A and B are shown
in Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively.
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Figure 7. Group A independent samples Mann-Whitney U Test results.
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Figure 8. Group B independent samples Mann-Whitney U Test results.
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Hypotheses Findings and Research Questions Results: Mean Service Days
The two research questions of this study involving the independent variable
service days were:
1A.

To what extent does the use of electronic warrant systems result in shorter
MSD than the use of legacy paper-based warrant systems?

2A.

How does the MSD compare between the two systems for each case type?

Two-way ANOVA test results using three county pairs. Based on the partially
deprecated ANOVA results, the null hypothesis Ho1A is rejected and the alternate
hypothesis Ha1A is supported at the 95% confidence level for all four county pairs.
Results of research question 1A are mixed. County pairs A0A2 and B0B1 favor the use of
e-warrants to reduce warrant service time; however, pairs A0A1 and B0B2 had longer
service times with e-warrants. Table 10 contains results of the two-way ANOVA for all
four county pairs, and complete detailed two-way ANOVA test results are contained in
Appendix F.
Mann-Whitney U test results using two groups of three counties. The results
of the Mann-Whitney U tests on the two combined three-county groups are split as shown
on Figures 7 and 8. Group A results indicate that the null hypothesis should not be
rejected (does not support the alternate) with an asymptotic significance of .865. For
Group A, the answer to research question 1A is that MSD in the e-warrant county is not
significantly different than the non-e-warrant counties.
Group B results suggest that the distributions are different with a significance
level of .000. The null hypothesis for group B is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is
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supported. The answer to research question 1A is that the MSD for the e-warrant counties
is 19 days longer than the base county with a similar population. Thus e-warrant systems
in the Group B test sample are less efficient than less sophisticated systems.
Study Results: Percent Warrants Served
Two-factor ANOVA assumption tests: Percent warrants served. PWS is
referred to in criminal justice circles as the “warrant clearance rate”, and it is a commonly
used measure of law enforcement performance with arrest warrants. PWS is a computed
dependent variable that was not directly provided by the state court data source. Thus, I
computed PWS for each county and for each case type*county combination prior to
evaluating assumptions for the two-way ANOVA. Because these percentages were
assigned to each warrant record in the county or case type/county combination, the
ANOVA assumptions were not met: (a) the independence of errors is not applicable; (b)
the data are not normally distributed; and (c) homogeneity of variance, while 100%
homogeneous was not applicable. Since all three assumptions are not met, the ANOVA
test results were not defensible; therefore, ANOVA test results are shown only in
Appendix G, and it was necessary to resort to alternative non-parametric tests for the
difference of the two proportions. I selected two different statistical methods to compare
proportions between independent samples: a large sample Z-test for the difference
between two population proportions; and a Pearson Chi-Square Test.
Large sample Z-test for the difference between two population proportions:
Percent warrants served. The only assumption for this test is that the two independent
samples are large. This assumption is met because the smallest population in both groups
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A and B is 1,642. I used the same two combined county groups that were assembled in
the Mann-Whitney U Tests for MSD, Group A and Group B, as. Group A contained data
from counties A0, A1,.and A2. Group B contained data from counties B0, B1, and B2. A
Microsoft Excel template was used to compute the test statistics shown in Table 13. The
Excel template was provided as a companion tool for the textbook Complete Business
Statistics (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2009).

Table 13
Results of Large Sample Z-Test for the Difference Between Two Population Proportions
E-Warrant
Flag = N

E-Warrant
Flag = Y

Size

4,422

8,884

Served

3,463

5,264

Proportion

0.7831

0.5925

Size

1,642

4,183

Served

1,300

2,842

Proportion

0.7917

0.6794

Group
A

B

Note. Green = favors use of e-warrants; Yellow = does not favor use of e-warrants;
Blue = not conclusive.

Group A had a pooled p-hat of 0.6559 and a test statistic (Z) of 21.7997. Group B
had a pooled p-hat of 0.7111 and a test statistic of 8.5077. Both group z-statistics fall to
the right of the rejection region for α = .01 (2.575) on the Z-distribution curve; therefore,
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both null hypotheses are rejected at the 99% confidence level with p-value of 0.0000,
which supports the alternate hypotheses that the PWS are not equal in both test groups.
Pearson Chi-square test for equality of proportions: Percent warrants
served. The Pearson Chi-square test of homogeneity is used to test for a difference in
proportions on two categorical variables in two or more independent samples (Franke,
Ho, & Christie, 2012, p. 451). The only assumption for a Chi-square test is that the
expected count in every cell is at least 5 (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2009, p. 665). This
assumption is met for all samples in this study. The Chi-square test is suited for
comparing e-warrant flag and case type. The same groups A and B that were used in the
Mann-Whitney U-Test and the large sample Z-test were used for this test. The results of
the Chi-square tests for both groups with all case types combined are displayed in Table
14.
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Table 14
Results of Chi-Square Test for All Case Types

Group

EWarrant
Flag

A

N

Y

Total

B

N

Y

Total

Warrant
Served Flag =
N

Warrant Served
Flag = Y

Total

Count

959

3463

4422

Expected Count

1521.7

2900.3

4422.0

% within E-Warr. Flag

21.7%

78.3%

100%

% of Total

7.2%

26.0%

33.2%

Count

3620

5264

8884

Expected Count

3057.3

5826.7

8884.0

% within E-Warr. Flag

40.7%

59.3%

100.0%

% of Total

27.2%

39.6%

66.8%

Count

4579

8727

13306

Expected Count

4579.0

8727.0

13306.0

% within E-Warr. Flag

34.4%

65.6%

100%

% of Total

34.4%

65.6%

100.0%

Count

342

1300

1642

Expected Count

474.4

1167.6

1642.0

% within E-Warr. Flag

20.8%

79.2%

100.0%

% of Total

5.9%

22.3%

28.2%

Count

1341

2842

4183

Expected Count

1208.6

2974.4

4183.0

% within E-Warr. Flag

32.1%

67.9%

100.0%

% of Total

23.0%

48.8%

71.8%

Count

1683

4142

5825

Expected Count

1683.0

4142.0

5825.0

% within E-Warr. Flag

28.9%

71.1%

100.0%

% of Total

28.9%

71.1%

100.0%

Note. Green = favors use of e-warrants; Yellow = does not favor use of e-warrants;
Blue = not conclusive.
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The Group A computed value of the Pearson Chi-Square statistic is 475.229 with
one degree of freedom. This value is greater than the rejection value of 6.63490 on the
Chi-Square distribution with 1 degree of freedom and an asymptotic significance level of
.000. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected and conclude that the proportions are not
equal.
The Group B computed value of the Pearson Chi-Square statistic is 72.382 with
one degree of freedom. This value is greater than the rejection value of 6.63490 on the
Chi-Square distribution with 1 degree of freedom and an asymptotic significance level of
.000. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that the proportions are equal and conclude
that the proportions are not equal.
Next I ran Chi-square tests by case type. Tables 15, 16, 17, and 18 contain results
of the Chi-square tests by case type within groups.
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Table 15
Results of Chi-Square Test by E-Warrant Flag and Case Type = Circuit

Group

Case
Type

EWarrant
Flag

A

Circuit

N

Y

Total

B

Circuit

N

Y

Total

Count

Warrant
Served
Flag =
N
33

Warrant
Served
Flag =
Y
658

Expected Count

141.6

549.4

691.0

% within E-Warr. Flag

4.8%

95.2%

100%

% of Total

1.8%

34.9%

36.7%

Count

353

840

1193

Expected Count

244.4

948.6

1193.0

% within E-Warr. Flag

29.6%

70.4%

100.0%

% of Total
Count

18.7%
386

44.6%
1498

63.3%
1884

Expected Count

386

1498

1884

% within E-Warr. Flag

20.50%

79.50%

100.00%

% of Total

20.50%

79.50%

100.00%

Count

11

387

398

Expected Count

57.5

340.5

398

% within E-Warr. Flag

2.80%

97.20%

100.00%

% of Total

0.80%

27.60%

28.30%

Count

192

814

1006

Expected Count

145.5

860.5

1006

% within E-Warr. Flag

19.10%

80.90%

100.00%

% of Total

13.70%

58.00%

71.70%

Count

203

1201

1404

Expected Count

203

1201

1404

% within E-Warr. Flag

14.50%

85.50%

100.00%

% of Total

14.50%

85.50%

100.00%

Total
691

Note. Degree of freedom = 1; Green = favors use of e-warrants; Yellow = does not favor use of ewarrants; Blue = not conclusive.
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Table 16
Results of Chi-Square Test by E-Warrant Flag and Case Type = Felony

Group

Case
Type

EWarrant
Flag

A

Felony

N

Y

Total

B

Felony

N

Y

Total

Count

Warrant
Served
Flag =
N
89

Warrant
Served
Flag =
Y
430

Expected Count

148.7

370.3

519

% within E-Warr. Flag

17.10%

82.90%

100.00%

% of Total

8.40%

40.80%

49.20%

Count

213

322

535

Expected Count

153.3

381.7

535

% within E-Warr. Flag

39.80%

60.20%

100.00%

% of Total

20.20%

30.60%

50.80%

Count

302

752

1054

Expected Count

302

752

1054

% within E-Warr. Flag

28.70%

71.30%

100.00%

% of Total

28.70%

71.30%

100.00%

Count

39

171

210

Expected Count

56.3

153.7

210

% within E-Warr. Flag

18.60%

81.40%

100.00%

% of Total

7.20%

31.60%

38.80%

Count

106

225

331

Expected Count

88.7

242.3

331

% within E-Warr. Flag

32.00%

68.00%

100.00%

% of Total

19.60%

41.60%

61.20%

Count

145

396

541

Expected Count

145

396

541

% within E-Warr. Flag

26.80%

73.20%

100.00%

% of Total

26.80%

73.20%

100.00%

Total
519

Note. Degree of freedom = 1; Green = favors use of e-warrants; Yellow = does not favor use of ewarrants; Blue = not conclusive.
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Table 17
Results of Chi-Square Test by E-Warrant Flag and Case Type = Misdemeanor

Group

Case
Type

EWarrant
Flag

A

Misdmnr.

N

Y

Total

B

Misdmnr.

N

Y

Total

Count

Warrant
Served
Flag =
N
361

Warrant
Served
Flag =
Y
1300

Expected Count

519.3

1141.7

1661

% within E-Warr. Flag

21.70%

78.30%

100.00%

% of Total

7.40%

26.70%

34.10%

Count

1163

2051

3214

Expected Count

1004.7

2209.3

3214

% within E-Warr. Flag

36.20%

63.80%

100.00%

% of Total

23.90%

42.10%

65.90%

Count

1524

3351

4875

Expected Count

1524

3351

4875

% within E-Warr. Flag

31.30%

68.70%

100.00%

% of Total

31.30%

68.70%

100.00%

Count

103

327

430

Expected Count

129.6

300.4

430

% within E-Warr. Flag

24.00%

76.00%

100.00%

% of Total

6.30%

20.00%

26.30%

Count

390

816

1206

Expected Count

363.4

842.6

1206

% within E-Warr. Flag

32.30%

67.70%

100.00%

% of Total

23.80%

49.90%

73.70%

Count

493

1143

1636

Expected Count

493

1143

1636

% within E-Warr. Flag

30.10%

69.90%

100.00%

% of Total

30.10%

69.90%

100.00%

Total
1661

Note. Degree of freedom = 1; Green = favors use of e-warrants; Yellow = does not favor use of ewarrants; Blue = not conclusive.
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Table 18
Results of Chi-Square Test by E-Warrant Flag and Case Type = Traffic

Group

Case
Type

EWarrant
Flag

A

Traffic

N

Y

Total

B

Traffic

N

Y

Total

Warrant
Served
Flag =
N

Warrant
Served
Flag =
Y

Total

Count

476

1075

1551

Expected Count

668.3

882.7

1551

% within E-Warr. Flag

30.70%

69.30%

100.00%

% of Total

8.70%

19.60%

28.20%

Count

1891

2051

3942

Expected Count

1698.7

2243.3

3942

% within E-Warr. Flag

48.00%

52.00%

100.00%

% of Total

34.40%

37.30%

71.80%

Count

2367

3126

5493

Expected Count

2367

3126

5493

% within E-Warr. Flag

43.10%

56.90%

100.00%

% of Total

43.10%

56.90%

100.00%

Count

189

415

604

Expected Count

226.6

377.4

604

% within E-Warr. Flag

31.30%

68.70%

100.00%

% of Total

8.40%

18.50%

26.90%

Count

653

987

1640

Expected Count

615.4

1024.6

1640

% within E-Warr. Flag

39.80%

60.20%

100.00%

% of Total

29.10%

44.00%

73.10%

Count

842

1402

2244

Expected Count

842

1402

2244

% within E-Warr. Flag

37.50%

62.50%

100.00%

% of Total

37.50%

62.50%

100.00%

Note. Degree of freedom = 1; Green = favors use of e-warrants; Yellow = does not favor use of ewarrants; Blue = not conclusive.
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The results were uniformly consistent with the results of the test with all case
types. The computed Chi-square statistics are contained in Table 19. All eight Chi-square
statistics are greater than the rejection value of 6.63490 on the Chi-Square distribution
with 1 degree of freedom and an asymptotic significance level of .000. Therefore, the null
hypothesis is rejected for every case type in both groups.

Table 19
Chi-Square Statistics by Group and Case Type
Group
A

B

Case
Type
Circuit

Chi-Square

df

165.379

1

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.000

Felony

66.197

1

.000

Misdmnr.

106.429

1

.000

Traffic

135.542

1

.000

Total

475.229

1

.000

Circuit

61.424

1

.000

Felony

11.852

1

.000

Misdmnr.

10.585

1

.000

Traffic

13.687

1

.000

Total

72.382

Note. Green = favors use of e-warrants; Yellow = does not favor use of e-warrants; Blue = not
conclusive.
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Hypotheses Findings and Research Questions Results: Percent Warrants Served
The two research questions of this study concerning the independent variable
percent warrants served were:
1B.

To what extent does the use of electronic warrant systems result in greater
PWS than the use of legacy paper-based warrant systems?

2B.

How does the PWS compare between the two systems for each case type?

Null hypothesis Ho1B is rejected and the alternate hypothesis is supported at the
99% confidence level for Group A and Group B. Results of research questions 1B and 2B
for both county groups indicate that the non-e-warrant county in each pair has a higher
(better) PWS than the paired e-warrants county in aggregate and by case type.
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Summary
This quantitative study tested two null hypotheses on dependent variable MSD,
and it tested two null hypotheses on the dependent variable PWS.
Results of research questions 1A and 2A on the effects of county and county*case
type, respectively, on the dependent variable MSD were mixed. The partially deprecated
two-way ANOVA test results were evenly split on question 1A, and the results were
mixed and inconclusive on question 2A.
Results of the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U Tests on Winsorized service days
yielded different results for Group A and Group B. For Group A, the answer to research
question 1A is that MSD in the e-warrant county is not significantly different than the
non-e-warrant counties. The answer to research question 1A for Group B; however, is
that the MSD for the e-warrant counties is 19 days longer than the base county with a
similar population. Thus e-warrant systems in the Group B test sample were less efficient
than less sophisticated systems. Question 2A regarding case type was not addressed by
the Mann-Whitney U test due to a continuous factor requirement.
Results of research questions 1B and 2B on the effects of county and county*case
type on the second dependent variable percent warrants served are summarized in Table
20. This set of 20 Z-tests and Chi-square tests uniformly showed better warrant service
performance in counties not using e-warrants.
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Table 20
Summary Findings for Percent Warrants Served
County*Case Type
County
Group

County

Circuit

Felony

Misdemeanor

Traffic

A

No

No

No

No

No

B

No

No

No

No

No

Note. Yes/Green = favors use of e-warrants; No/Yellow = does not favor use of e-warrants;
NC/Blue = not conclusive.

This chapter provided the results of this research study. The four research
questions were answered using two-way ANOVA, non-parametric tests, and descriptive
statistics. An interpretation of the findings, a discussion of research limitations,
recommendations for further research, and the implications of social change are
contained in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The stakes are high for positive social change when wanted persons are brought to
justice quickly before subjects can commit further crimes against the public. I designed
this research study to investigate the public safety value of e-warrant systems. The U.S.
Government and criminal justice groups have recommended e-warrant systems to law
enforcement agencies for many years without supporting empirical evidence. Using
dependent variables MSD and PWS, I sought to measure the effects of these advanced
warrant systems against more traditional, predominantly paper-based and independent
warrant systems. The specific problem was that the factors related to electronic warrant
systems improving safety were not understood, and there was a paucity of scholarly
evidence in support of e-warrant systems. This study was the first study designed to
confirm or disconfirm the effectiveness of e-warrant systems.
The findings of this study are a mixture of expected results, unexpected results,
and evidence that warrant service effectiveness may be affected by factors not explored
in this study. The results of MSD were split evenly on the four sample data sets. Also, the
results of a deeper examination of MSD by county and case type was split with six not
favoring e-warrants and five favoring e-warrants. The analysis of PWS favored the none-warrant county in both test groups.
Interpretation of Findings
This study of e-warrant efficacy was the first known of its kind in the scientific
literature. Test results suggest that the clearance rate the base counties without e-warrants
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out-performed the counties with e-warrants for every case type. This was not expected,
especially given that law enforcement officers value the safety benefits from immediate
and multi-jurisdiction warrant information. Further exploration into this phenomenon is
needed to find what other key factors may be at work in the subject counties. One
potential factor is the degree of e-warrant system adoption and exploitation. It is not
known how the county sheriff’s departments, whose warrant data were examined in this
study, used the new system. For example, the new system may have fully replaced a
legacy system and manual processes or it may have been used primarily for state
reporting purposes. It is also possible that prior to adopting the e-warrant system, record
keeping was inaccurate or incomplete. The state court organization that provided the
historical data for this study did not provide qualitative information about the nature of
county warrant processes, other local systems in use, interfaces, and system architectures.
Data quality and completeness are areas of concern. A further investigation is
indicated to verify that all warrant records were included in the samples received and that
the state reporting process did not filter out certain types of served or unserved warrants
that could explain the one-sided and counter-intuitive results on PWS. For example, if
some served warrants were excluded from the data extracts, the e-warrant statistics would
be negatively impacted. A review of the state’s warrant data collection process is needed
to aid in understanding the results of this study, which partially favored legacy systems
over e-warrant systems, which is counter-intuitive, as e-warrants are known to be more
effective in practice.
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The original research design involved just two counties, one non-e-warrant basis
county and one e-warrant county. Once it became known that the data were available for
many counties within a single state, I expanded the design to two basis counties and four
e-warrant counties to improve reliability. In the final analysis this design expansion may
have highlighted an inconclusive finding in the case of dependent variable MST. If the
research had been limited to any of the four single county pairs, for example (see Table
10), the findings would have been much different. Pairs A0A1 and B0B2 would have not
supported e-warrants, while pairs A0A2 and B0B1 would have supported e-warrants. But,
by analyzing four pairs instead of one pair, a more consistent result was expected;
however, a strong conclusion in either direction is not supported. This suggests that other
factors exist within the agencies that strongly impact MST besides the independent
variables WST (county) and case type.
Limitations of the Study
The pair-wise examination of six samples from similar-sized counties, while
sound in design and purpose, did not yield conclusive evidence of improved warrant
service dependent variables. Even after combining counties into two similar population
groups of three counties each, the results were mixed in the case of MSD. The data
samples of 2 full years of warrants-- thousands of records should have been more than
adequate to expose any major systems impacts on the dependent variables, if all other
factors were the same. The results suggest that other factors besides the warrant tracking
system in use may have an important effect on an agency’s warrant service as shown by
clearance rate (PWS) and MST.

125
The limitations of this study; therefore, are related to the scope of the study
design:
1.

The study did not examine individual county warrant data before and after
transitioning to the new e-warrant system. As a result, it is not known how
adoption of e-warrants affected warrant service in each county.

2.

This study did not account for unknown organizational warrant process
differences between study counties—differences that may have
significantly affected warrant service.

3.

The quality of sample data sets, especially completeness and accuracy are
not well qualified. For example, if the sample data sets did not include all
warrants of a certain category or status, the results might be significantly
affected.

The next section describes recommendations for future e-warrant research that
address the limitations of this study.
Recommendations
This section outlines three recommendations for follow-on research to further
explore the research questions while addressing the limitations of this study.
First, the inconclusive evidence on MST and counterintuitive PWS results of this
pair-wise county comparison punctuates the need for a time-based study of individual
counties before and after e-warrant system adoption. There are many potential
environmental and organizational factors that distinguish counties from each other;
therefore, a linear time study of individual counties before and after e-warrants may
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expose the direct effects of e-warrants and other factors that may improve e-warrant
system results. The goal of this type of study would be to eliminate the effects of
environmental and procedural differences between agencies not accounted for in this
study, and which may have had a significant impact on warrant service results. A followon study of the four e-warrant counties A1, A2, B1, and B2 would be a logical choice, with
a time frame of 2 years—1 year before the new system and 1 year after startup of the new
system, could demonstrate meaningful warrant service performance transformations.
The second recommendation is a follow-on qualitative investigation of each of
this study county’s warrant processes, system architecture, and interfaces. Current
process models of the six subject counties may reveal significant differences in manual
and automated processes. Interviews with key sheriffs’ office staff and IT personnel in
each county are needed to develop comparative process models. The goal of this research
would be to identify potential new independent variables that could be empirically tested
as determinants of MSD and PWS. Unfortunately, an in-depth study of the subject
warrant systems was not practical within the scope of this research, and the court
organization that provided data was not privileged to this information.
The third and final recommendation for further research is an in-depth
examination of the data collection process used by the state court system that provided
data for this study. The objective of this research would be to identify any potential
threats to data quality or completeness. A technical review of system interfaces and an
end-to-end examination of warrant record creation through final disposition is needed. If
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errors or omissions are discovered that can be corrected, then some or all of the
individual tests could be repeated using corrected data.
This study was designed to first compare results of all warrant types across
similar-sized counties then drill down by case types. Because the county-wide results
were inconclusive on the dependent variable MSD, future research should again seek to
identify differences by case type. For example, if clearance rates for serious felonies were
shown to improve with e-warrants, the positive impact to public safety would be
significant. As the e-warrant body of knowledge advances beyond this research, future
studies should focus on warrants for serious crimes because of the greater potential
impact to public safety.
The EWM2 provides a starting foundational framework for assessing the maturity
level of warrant systems. A further investigation into the subject counties in this study is
needed to collect qualitative information about agency warrant processes, how the new
e-warrant system is used, and any ongoing dependencies that may exist on a legacy
warrant system, possibly impacting the utility of the new system. This type of research
may lead to a revision of the feature list and/or a refinement of the model’s maturity
levels. A revised EWM2 would inform the design of follow-up studies on e-warrant
efficacy.
Another aspect of electronic warrants not directly tested in this study is the effect
of out-of-county arrests made more likely by electronic warrant information sharing.
Interagency sharing is a principle tenet of e-warrants. Sharing warrant information with
other law enforcement agencies is a key feature of level 3 in the proposed EWM2. If
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warrants are quickly and passively shared across jurisdictional boundaries
(municipalities, counties, states, tribes, federal agencies, etc.), more warrants should be
served in shorter time. A study to investigate this factor would require warrant files
containing a serving agency identifier or two simple out-of-county service flags, one for
local warrant served out of county and one for other agency warrant served in county.
When I collected data for this study, I inquired at the state court’s IT department if this
data were available, but I was informed that it was not available. The suggestion for
follow-on examination of the data collection process described earlier in this section
might reveal a possible source for jurisdictional service data.
Implications
The primary implication of this study is that counties seeking to improve warrant
clearance rates and service times should examine their internal warrant processes and
organizational limitations for areas that need improvement, and consider implementing a
e-warrant system to seek further performance improvements. This study produced no
consistent evidence to suggest that similar-sized counties affected arrest performance by
adoption of an e-warrant system. Adopting an e-warrant system without first examining
other non-IT factors may not result in better clearance rates or service times. For
example, the most sophisticated e-warrant system cannot improve arrest rates if the
agency suffers from a lack of personnel dedicated to locating and arresting warrant
subjects. A balance of internal process improvements and information system
improvements is recommended.
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Conclusions
The practical knowledge of improved public safety through intelligent application
of electronic warrant information technology remain unproven by scientific study.
Although in practice e-warrant systems are more effective than legacy warrant systems,
the results of this study indicated that there are some areas that need improvement. More
research is needed to identity other variables that impact the outcomes of e-warrant
systems. Criminal justice practitioner-leaders in the public sector need to make
management decisions based on proven performance. This study opened the door on
research that may eventually provide definitive evidence for the advantages of e-warrant
systems. However, further study is needed to support or discredit the effects of advanced
electronic warrant tracking systems. This first study of this kind did not support or
discredit the use of e-warrant systems for effect on MSD, and it revealed an unexpected
bias against e-warrants on PWS in both study groups, a result that also requires further
investigation to explain or discredit this finding.
This research has shown that other factors besides e-warrant systems and case
type determine warrant performance in similar-sized county agencies. For sheriffs and
criminal justice practitioners in the United States, a best practice recommendation is to
ensure that the everyday manual processes related to serving warrants are operating
efficiently before committing to new information systems. Agencies should look for
improvements in warrant service policies, staffing levels, and financing to improve
warrant clearance rates and times. Further research outlined in this chapter is designed to
identify specific nonsystem factors that determine warrant service performance and a
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better understanding of transformative information system impacts within a single
agency. Although e-warrant systems have resulted in positive social change over
paper-based legacy systems, further research is needed to identify the specific
performance factors that could improve these systems for greater positive social change.
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Appendix A: Outliers
This appendix contains SPSS output box plot figures of service days for each
County. These plots include all outliers prior to Winsorization.

Figure A1. County pair A0A1 service days box plots.
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Figure A2. County pair A0A2 service days box plots.
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Figure A3. County pair B0B1 service days box plots.
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Figure A3. County pair B0B2 service days box plots.
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Appendix B: Service Days Distribution (Winsorized)
This appendix contains SPSS output Quantile-Quantile plots of service days vs.
normal distribution for each county.

Figure B1. County A0 service days (Winsorized) vs. normal curve.
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Figure B2. County A1 service days (Winsorized) vs. normal curve.
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Figure B3. County A2 service days (Winsorized) vs. normal curve.
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Figure B4. County B0 service days (Winsorized) vs. normal curve.
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Figure B5. County B1 service days (Winsorized) vs. normal curve.
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Figure B6. County B2 service days (Winsorized) vs. normal curve.
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Appendix C: Service Days Histograms (Winsorized)
This appendix contains SPSS histograms for each county after Winsorization.

Figure C1. County A0 service days histogram.
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Figure C2. County A1 service days histogram.
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Figure C3. County A2 service days histogram.
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Figure C4. County B0 service days histogram.
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Figure C5. County B1 service days histogram.
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Figure C6. County B2 service days histogram.
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Appendix D: Service Days Profile Plots
This appendix contains SPSS line plots of MSD for each county pair and each
county pair by case type.

Figure D1. County Pair A0A1 service days by case type profile plot. The base line
county without e-warrants is represented by the dashed line. Note: The mean difference
for felony case types was found to be not statistically significant at the alpha .05 level.
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Figure D2. County A0A2 service days profile plot. The base line county without
e-warrants is represented by the dashed line. Note: The mean difference for circuit
criminal case types was found to be not statistically significant at the alpha .05 level.
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Figure D3. County B0B1 service days profile plot. The base line county without
e-warrants is represented by the dashed line. Note: The mean difference for circuit
criminal and traffic case types were found to be not statistically significant at the alpha
.05 level.

162

Figure D4. County B0B2 service days profile plot. The base line county without
e-warrants is represented by the dashed line. Note: The mean difference for felony case
types was found to be not statistically significant at the alpha .05 level.
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Appendix E: Percent Warrants Served Profile Plots
This appendix contains SPSS line plots of PWS for each county pair by case type.

Figure E1. County Pair A0A1 PWS by case type profile plot. The base line county
without e-warrants is represented by the dashed line.
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Figure E2. County Pair A0A2 PWS profile plot. The base line county without ewarrants is represented by the dashed line.
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Figure E3. County Pair B0B1 PWS profile plot. The base line county without
e-warrants is represented by the dashed line.
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Figure E4. County Pair B0B2 service days profile plot. The base line county
without e-warrants is represented by the dashed line. Note: The mean difference for
felony case types was found to be not statistically significant at the alpha .05 level.
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Appendix F: Two-way ANOVA Results on Mean Service Days
This appendix contains results and SPSS output of two-way ANOVA tests on the
dependent variable MSD. The results of these tests are deprecated due partial assumption
failures noted in Chapter 4.
Null hypothesis Ho1A comparing MSD across counties is rejected, and the
alternate hypothesis Ha1A is supported at the 95% confidence level for all four county
pairs. Results are depicted in Table F1, and mean differences are shown in Table F2.
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Table F1
Two-Way ANOVA Results for Winsorized Service Days
Type III
Sum of
Squares

df

Mean Square

CountyCode

858540.230

1

CaseType

5677404.262

CountyCode*
CaseType

County
Pair

Source

A0A1

A0A2

B0B1

B0B2

Partial
Eta
Squared

F

Sig.

858540.230

41.021

0.000

0.006

3

1892468.087

90.422

0.000

0.036

794356.333

3

264785.444

12.651

0.000

0.005

CountyCode

1516177.452

1

1516177.452

125.595

0.000

0.025

CaseType

2453023.711

3

817674.57

67.734

0.000

0.040

CountyCode*
CaseType

1238259.691

3

412753.23

34.191

0.000

0.021

CountyCode

562341.373

1

562341.373

44.952

0.000

0.015

CaseType

3123203.59

3

1041067.863

83.219

0.000

0.080

CountyCode*
CaseType

117072.225

3

39024.075

3.119

0.025

0.003

CountyCode

562341.373

1

562341.373

44.952

0.000

0.015

CaseType

3123203.59

3

1041067.863

83.219

0.000

0.080

CountyCode*
CaseType

117072.225

3

39024.075

3.119

0.025

0.003
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Table F2
Two-Way ANOVA Mean Differences for Winsorized Service Days by County Pair (all
Case Types)

County Pair

F-Statistic

Mean Diff.
(L-R)

Sig.

Partial Eta
Squared

A0A1

40.021

-26.622

0.000

0.006

A0A2

125.595

47.596

0.000

0.025

B0B1

4.606

8.042

0.032

0.002

B0B2

44.952

-32.555

0.000

0.015

Null hypothesis Ho2A comparing case types across counties is rejected, and the
alternate hypothesis Ha2A is supported at the 95% confidence level for all four county
pairs. Results of research question 2A were mixed. Two-way ANOVA results are
summarized by case type in Tables F3 through F6. Shaded cells indicate ANOVA results
that were not significant at the 95% confidence level. Mean differences shown are
calculated left minus right (L-R). For example, mean difference for pair A0A1 was
calculated as mean of A0 minus the mean of A1. Therefore, a negative mean difference
indicates that the e-warrant county in the pair had a longer MSD than the basis
(non-e-warrant) county. A negative mean difference suggests that the e-warrant system
had the negative effect of increasing warrant service times, and a positive mean
difference suggests that e-warrants improved (shortened) service times. Five county*case
type pairs showed faster service time with e-warrants, and six showed worse service
times with e-warrants.
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Table F3
Circuit Criminal Cases Two-Way ANOVA Results for Service Days by County*Case Type

County Pair

F-Statistic

Mean Diff.
(L-R)

Sig.

Partial Eta
Squared

A0A1

66.675

-71.343

0.000

0.009

A0A2

1.650

-9.172

0.199

0.000

B0B1

0.440

-4.221

0.507

0.000

B0B2

8.806

-22.974

0.003

0.003

Note. Mean Differences are based on SPSS estimated marginal means, not the actual sample
means. Shaded cells mark results that are not statistically significant (p < .05).

Table F4
Felony Cases Two-Way ANOVA Results for Service Days by County*Case Type

County Pair

F-Statistic

Mean Diff.
(L-R)

Sig.

Partial Eta
Squared

A0A1

0.000

0.214

0.985

0.000

A0A2

16.704

52.539

0.000

0.000

B0B1

5.021

22.924

0.025

0.002

B0B2

1.798

-18.881

0.180

0.001

Note. Mean Differences are based on SPSS estimated marginal means, not the actual sample
means. Shaded cells mark results that are not statistically significant (p < .05).
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Table F5
Misdemeanor Cases Two-Way ANOVA Results for Service Days by County*Case Type

County Pair

F-Statistic

Mean Diff.
(L-R)

Sig.

Partial Eta
Squared

A0A1

5.539

-12.764

0.019

0.001

A0A2

120.395

64.438

0.000

0.024

B0B1

5.873

15.835

0.015

0.002

B0B2

19.464

-36.206

0.000

0.007

Note. Mean Differences are based on SPSS estimated marginal means, not the actual sample
means.

Table F6
Traffic Cases Two-Way ANOVA Results for Service Days by County*Case Type

County Pair

F-Statistic

Mean Diff.
(L-R)

Sig.

Partial Eta
Squared

A0A1

15.675

-22.594

0.000

0.002

A0A2

180.030

82.579

0.000

0.036

B0B1

0.153

-2.370

0.696

0.000

B0B2

52.642

-52.157

0.000

0.018

Note. Mean Differences are based on SPSS estimated marginal means, not the actual sample
means. Shaded cells mark results that are not statistically significant (p < .05).

Partial eta squared values are very low--all under 4% indicating a very small
influence on dependent variable MSD.
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Figures F1 and F2 contain summary clustered bar charts for county Group A and
county Group B, respectively. Figure F1 reveals a consistently low service time for
county A2 in all case types; with a MSD of 50.1 compared to 106.0 for county A1 and
138.1 for county A2. This suggests that the low service times may be due to other factors.
Figure F2 shows that county B0 had service times between B1 and B2 in misdemeanor
cases, felony cases, and overall. County B0 had the shortest MSD for the more serious
circuit criminal cases. It is notable that the non-e-warrant county in both groups had the
best (shortest) MSD of the group for the most serious circuit criminal case types.

Figure F1. County Group A mean service days (Winsorized).
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Figure F2. County Group B mean service days (Winsorized).
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Appendix G: Two-way ANOVA Results on Percent Warrants Served
This appendix contains results and SPSS output two-way ANOVA tests on
dependent variable PWS. These results are included for information only. Due to failure
of all three two-way ANOVA assumption tests, these results were not considered in the
interpretation of results.
Due to test assumption failures, null hypothesis Ho1B comparing PWS across
counties could not be rejected, and likewise the alternate hypothesis Ha1B cannot be
supported for all four county pairs. Results are depicted in Table G1.
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Table G1
Two-Way ANOVA Results for Percent Warrants Served
County
Pair

Source

A0A1

CountyCode
CaseType
CountyCode*
CaseType

A0A2

CountyCode
CaseType
CountyCode*
CaseType

B0B1

CountyCode
CaseType
CountyCode*
CaseType

B0B2

CountyCode
CaseType

Type III
Sum of
Squares

Partial
Eta
Squared

df

Mean
Square

F

Sig.

974328.853

1

974328.853

1.63115E+27

0.000

1.000

508907.856

3

169635.952

2.83991E+26

0.000

1.000

77515.25

3

25838.417

4.32567E+25

0.000

1.000

61302.189

1

61302.189

.

.

1.000

337731.075

3

112577.025

.

.

1.000

15850.56

3

5283.52

.

.

1.000

112464.173

1

112464.173

.

.

1.000

300525.728

3

100175.243

.

.

1.000

23992.845

3

7997.615

.

.

1.000

90330.244

1

90330.244

.

.

1.000

393358.355
3
131119.452
.
.
1.000
CountyCode*
CaseType
10705.277
3
3568.426
.
.
1.000
Note. Empty cells denote an invalid result (e.g. divide by zero) due to failed test assumptions. The
two-way ANOVA test was run at the alpha = .05 level.
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Tables G2 and G3 are included to illustrate the compared mean differences in the
sample data sets by all case types and by each case type, respectively.

Table G2
Two-Way ANOVA Results for Percent Warrants Served by County (all Case Types)
County Pair

Mean Diff.
(L-R)

Sig.

A0A1

23.50

.

A0A2

8.36

.

B0B1

12.53

.

B0B2

11.75

.

Note. Empty cells denote an invalid result (e.g. divide by zero) due to failed test assumptions. The
two-way ANOVA test was run at the alpha = .05 level.
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Table G3
Two-Way ANOVA Results for Percent Warrants Served by County*Winsorized Case Type
Circuit

Felony

Misdemeanor

Traffic

County
Pair

Mean
Diff.

Sig.

Mean
Diff.

Sig.

Mean
Diff.

Sig.

Mean
Diff.

Sig.

A0A1

31.90

.

26.70

.

15.90

.

19.50

.

A0A2

14.30

.

6.30

.

8.00

.

4.90

.

B0B1

21.20

.

10.10

.

7.20

.

11.6

.

B0B2

11.40

.

17.60

.

9.50

.

6.20

.

Note. Empty cells denote an invalid result (e.g. divide by zero) due to failed test assumptions. The
two-way ANOVA test was run at the alpha = .05 level.

Figures G1 and G2 contain summary clustered column charts for county Group A
and county Group B, respectively. County A0 in Group A had the best clearance rate for
every case type and overall. Similarly, county A1 experienced the worst clearance rate,
and county A2 had the middle clearance rate in all categories.
Figures G1 and G2 are included to illustrate the relative means in the sample data
sets by all case types and by each case type for county Group A and Group B,
respectively. In Group B, County B0 had the best performance across all categories.
Counties B1 and B2 were very close overall (66.8% and 69.5% respectively), and they
were split between second and third position in the case type categories.
Consistently higher PWS appears counter-intuitive, suggesting that other
significant factors may have influenced warrant service performance. A set of profile
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plots for each of the four county pairs depicting PWS for every case type is contained in
Appendix E.

Figure G1. County group A percent warrants served.
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Figure G2. County group B percent warrants served.

